Sunday, April 5, 2009

Signs of Economic Spring

This is from a few weeks back. I misplaced my note to post this. I’ll link directly, since you probably already tossed the paper.

In the March 14 issue of The Wall Street Journal was a piece entitled “Signs of Stability Drive Up Stocks”.

I don’t care about stocks in this class. What I do care about is data indicating that we aren’t in free fall any more. Most of what I’m interested in is towards the end of the article and in the chart.

There it shows that futures prices for copper are up. This trend has continued over the last 3 weeks. Copper can be stored (which tends to take prices of other metals out of cycle with the rest of the economy), but we use so much of it that this can get really expensive, and it ends up tracking the economy pretty well.

It also shows the Baltic Dry Index – essentially a price for shipping containers by ship - going up, although it has faltered since then.

Friday, April 3, 2009

John Stewart, Sovereign Default, Sovereignty and the Treaty of Westphalia

John Stewart noted on The Daily Show that countries that default on loans are treated differently than regular people (got a link Anthony?).

A (loan) default by a country is known as a “sovereign default”. (If you don’t know it, type “define sovereign” into Google.)

This goes back to the point in history when the sovereign and the government were basically the same thing. Now that most countries don’t have sovereigns, we personify the government as the sovereign.

This is actually really convenient for unscrupulous politicians and bureaucrats because it allows them to avoid personal responsibility by saying the government did it, not themselves.

Sovereignty is a complex idea that came out of the Middle Ages. (You only need to briefly skim the linked article.)

Sovereignty was codified in the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War. That codification is important enough to be known as Westphalian sovereignty. There are 3 basic principles:

  • Within countries, only members of those countries can make decisions about the country.
  • Countries are equal.
  • Countries shouldn’t interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

In some sense, the story of the last century has been the continued application of the principals of Westphalian sovereignty to countries that should be excluded from that privilege on moral grounds:

  • Communist countries didn’t violate the letter of the first principle because they claimed that only the party members were the real members of the country, and the previous stakeholders were all imposters.
  • The UN is such a basket case because it isn’t clear that countries are equal. Nuff said. It’s also a problem when you create new countries: you can’t just make them equal by saying they’re equal. There’s also an issue with imperialism here: the Europeans were clearly not treating other countries as equal when they went out and added them to their colonial empires.
  • This is why the allies didn’t do much to save the Jews in Nazi Germany. It’s also why some people didn’t like Bush invading Iraq.

It was difficult to envision these problems in advance though. Potential political leaders prior to 1900 were heavily steeped in a sense of entitlement (that they could make decisions), basic decency (so others in the same position were treated well), and integrity (to respect the decisions of others’ countries). For all the faults of leadership by the elite, consistency with these principals wasn’t one of them.

This issue of Westphalian sovereignty is of specific importance in macroeconomics right now because it means that when an international agency loans money to a country:

  • Once the money enters that country, only the members of that country can decide whether to repay it or not.
  • The position of a borrowing country is legally equal to that of a lending country, so a sovereign default often devolves into a diplomatic version of “he said, she said”. Loans through the IMF or World Bank are perhaps worse, because it isn’t clear that they have any legal standing against countries. They certainly can’t enforce any standing that they do have.
  • You just can’t invade another country because they borrowed from your citizens and didn’t repay them.

These are all OK as long as leaders are trained to play by these rules. But they’re not any more: now they play by a different set of rules and then use these as cover.

So, the difference between a person defaulting and a country defaulting boils down to the country being treated differently on the middle count (where bankruptcy court does make lenders and borrowers unequal) and the last count (where there is some limited ability to use force or the threat thereof against individuals).

An economic take on this is that we created big moral hazard problems when we responded inappropriately to violations of the underlying foundation that makes Westphalian sovereignty workable. When confronted by countries that morally violated those foundations – like the Soviet Union for the first one, Belgium in the Congo for the second, and Nazi Germany for the third – we didn’t address the problems with Westphalian sovereignty, or throw the whole idea out the window. Instead, we 1) grafted kind--hearted ideas (e.g., the U.N, the IMF, or the World Bank) on to the system of Westphalian sovereignty without clarifying their position in the framework, and 2) hugely diluted the club of nations that were supposed to abide by Westphalian sovereignty with new members uneducated in its successes who had been recently exposed to violations that were weakly punished. We shouldn’t be surprised that there have been problems.

Our response to that has been to complain a lot and to stop teaching high school students about all this because it isn’t amenable to multiple choice exams.

John Stewart is a bright guy, with smart writers, who probably know most of this. But … it’s a comedy show … and most of the viewers can get the joke while puzzling over the irony.

ADDENDUM: I did mention, but forgot to put in the first draft of this post, that developed countries used to violate the sovereignty of less-developed countries quite routinely. This probably discouraged defaults! There isn’t an easy to way to convey how frequently this was done, but one thing that you can do is go to the Wikipedia page entitled “List of United States Military History Events” and search for the word “interests” as a polite way of saying it was all about money. You’ll only find one example after 1932.

The Difficulty of Macroeconomic Policy

I mentioned this September 18 Brad DeLong post several weeks ago:

Is 2008 Our 1929?

No. It is not. The most important reason it is not is that Bernanke and Paulson are both focused like laser beams on not making the same mistakes as were made in 1929.

They are also focused, but not quite as much, on not making the mistakes made by Arthur Burns in the 1970s.

And they are also focused, but not quite as much, on not making the mistakes the Bank of Japan made in the 1990s.

They want to make their own, original, mistakes...

James Hamilton – a future Nobel prize medium-lister who blogs at EconBrowser - has some more comments about those mistakes.

David Leonhardt on Stimulus Choices

David Leonhardt’s Wednesday “Economic Scene” column in The New York Times are always worth reading even if you don’t always agree with him.

The April 1 column raised an interesting point: countries that have thicker social safety nets are less inclined to pursue stimulus, while those with thinner nets are likely to spend more.

Specifically, western European stimulus packages are smaller than the American one because their baseline social spending is higher.

He also raises the interesting point that summits in time of crisis are common:

In the summer of 1933, just as they will do on Thursday, heads of government and their finance ministers met in London to talk about a global economic crisis. …

What’s interesting about that one is that:

More than any other country, Germany — Nazi Germany — then set out on a serious stimulus program.

I have a couple of issues.

First, he’s awfully sure that stimulus works, even though economists are a lot less sure of that than pundits and politicians.

Second, one problem with comparing the U.S. with other countries as he does in the accompanying chart is that it isn’t clear whether state and local spending is included for the U.S. Since our system is federal, a great deal of our social safety net is provided at the state and local level (that’s why places like Alabama and California can have such different social services). If the IMF source that he used compares central governments to central governments, it’s going to make the U.S. look lousy.

Funny thing: the IMF, like many international agencies, has a tendency to make choices on data that do make the U.S. look bad. So maybe I’m correct to be suspicious.

Unemployment Is Up Again

The unemployment rate went up to 8.5% in March.

This is more bad news. But, keep in mind that the unemployment rate is a lagging indicator, so when the economy does trough, the unemployment rate will continue to rise for a while.

Also keep in mind that we’re seeing a lot of record/date noting in the legacy media: statements like this is the highest rate since 1983.

This is correct.

But, last month was also the highest since 1983, so there isn’t anything new there.

It’s like saying the Jazz are still not the best team in the league: it would be more useful if they told us something we didn’t already know.

Thursday, April 2, 2009

Country Risk of the G-20

Credit default swaps (CDS’s) are a type of insurance that one buys against the potential default on a loan/bond.*

CDS prices are quotes in the percent of the loan you have to pay up front to get the whole thing insured. When judging these prices, you need to recall that a basis point is 1/100th of a percentage point.

Alea has posted current CDS rates for most G-20 countries. The U.S., Germany and France are the lowest at around 60 basis points (that’s something like a 1 in 150 chance of default). The worst is Argentina at 3,750 basis points, or a better than 1 in 3 chance of defaulting.

For perspective, Lehman CDS’s were selling for 475 on September 10 (the week before they went belly up).

* Having to pay off the insurance to parties whose investments did go bad is the main problem with AIG over the last year. Other than that, CDS’s have gotten a bad reputation: experts are actually rather surprised that this market has functioned as well as it has given the circumstances. Pundits more or less predicted complete collapse in this market last fall, and it didn’t happen.

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

The G-20 In Four Maps

These maps show the relative sizes of the economies of the G-20 countries, in order from smallest to largest.

Argentina,_South_Africa,_Saudi_Arabia,_Indonesia,_Turkey_and_Australia 

Above we have:

  • Argentina in red,
  • South Africa in blue,
  • Saudi Arabia in green,
  • Indonesia in orange,
  • Turkey in brown, and
  • Australia in yellow

South_Korea,_Mexico,_India,_Russia,_Brazil_and_Canada

Above we have:

  • South Korea in blue,
  • Mexico in brown,
  • India in green,
  • Russia in orange,
  • Brazil in red, and
  • Canada in yellow.

Italy,_France,_China_and_the_United_Kingdom

Above we have:

  • Italy in blue,
  • France in green,
  • The United Kingdom in red, and
  • China in orange.

Japan_and_Germany

Lastly, we have

  • Germany in red, and
  • Japan in blue.

They’re currently having a summing about macroeconomics, in a forum in which equal representation (and equal photo-ops – except for the Michelle and Carla factor).

But, these maps should make it clear that macroeconomically, the countries are anything but equal. And the moose in the room is that the other 19 countries are economically small relative to the U.S. Collectively, they are about twice the size of the U.S. economy, though.

It’s worthwhile to mention why the U.S. Congress was put together with two houses: because proportional representation in the House would allow domination by the populous states, while equal representation in the Senate would give outsized power to the smaller states.

By that mark, what we get with international meeting like this is too much emphasis on the interests of small economies.

Note that in no way am I advocating a U.S. dominated international meeting, but I do take the position that our views are not likely to carry the weight that they should in a forum like this.

Also notable, are the large economies that weren’t invited because of ethnic, religious and regional diversity considerations – with roughly equivalent states:

  • Spain = New York
  • The Netherlands = Florida
  • Sweden = Ohio
  • Belgium = New Jersey
  • Switzerland = North Carolina
  • Poland = Georgia
  • Norway = Virginia
  • Taiwan = Massachusetts
  • Austria = Washington
  • Greece = Maryland
  • Denmark = Minnesota
  • Iran = Arizona

Can you imagine if the U.S. Congress met without the members from those states?

Notes:

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