Thursday, January 29, 2015

“Every Silver Lining has a Touch of Grey”

Some U.S. firms are starting to have profitability problems because of the appreciation of the dollar.

It sounds kind of dumb at first, but when thinking about exchange rates, saying something like an appreciation/depreciation is good for everyone except those it’s bad for is actually fairly accurate.

In this case, the dollar is strong because some of the other big economies — the European Union and Japan primarily — have been doing relatively poorly.

See the article entitled “Strong Dollar Squeezes U.S. Firms” in the January 27 issue of The Wall Street Journal.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

Greece Has the Ball Today

Greece is holding its national election today. The polls are not closed yet, but the exit polls show a (not unexpected) victory by the Syriza party.

This party wants to end the fiscal austerity enacted over the last few years to help the Greek government get in a position to consistently pay its bills: basically, better tax collection, and less giveaways of government funds to the politically connected.

Syriza wants a haircut on existing debt, borrowed by the Greek government, from foreign lenders. A haircut means that the two sides will decide to revalue the debt principal at a substantially lower lever. I’ve heard rumors of a 70% cut. Syriza is ready to leave the Eurozone if no one agrees to the haircut.

Quite a lot of people in the Eurozone would gladly wave goodbye to Greece.

The problem is: what if this policy action is seen as beneficial by voters in other troubled countries? This is called contagion.

The thing you have to remember about macro is that there are no experiments to see how policy works. People may be voting on this when it sounds like a good idea before they can possibly know if it is a good idea.

Here’s one view: the way for the Eurozone to contain contagion if Greece leaves, is to do everything they can to make the situation in Greece look worse, so that voters will get the message.

A complementary view is that as we get to higher and higher levels of macroeconomic understanding, we come to appreciate that the public is better at anticipating crises, and covering their own a**es, than politicians and bureaucrats give them credit for.

In particular, we talk about self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, if people are worried about a future shortage of widgets, they’ll buy more widgets now, creating a shortage. We see this all the time with empty grocery store shelves in advance of potentially devastating storms.

So, what’s going on in Greece this winter? Hmmm. Greeks aren’t paying their taxes.* It’s almost as if people know that their taxes are going to pay foreign lenders, and they know their neighbor is voting for a party that will stop that, so they stop paying their taxes in advance, so that when that party gets into power they have no choice but to stop the payments.

The difference between a macroeconomist and a journalist is that the macroeconomist will cut those 4 words in italics off the front of that explanation.

* The link is from the Financial Times. They probably won’t let you see it unless you register. Don’t worry about, go and register. They are very good at asking you to be officially involved, but they do not make a hard sell to get you to buy their product.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Tooting Our Horn for Us

Many of you are economics majors.

Good for you. It turns out that economics is the social science mentioned most often in The New York Times, and most often in the Congressional Record.

And yet, it’s not as popular as other majors nationwide, like psychology and history, and we barely beat out sociology.*

This won’t be on the test, but you can read the article entitled “How Economists Came to Dominate the Conversation” by (Dave Berri’s friend) Justin Wolfers in the the January 23 issue of The New York Times.

Via Greg Mankiw’s Blog.

* Economics isn’t a huge major at SUU, but we’re doing OK. Generally speaking, economics does better as a major, purely in terms of numbers of graduates, when the department is housed in a college of arts and letters. I’m not advocating that change for SUU, just pointing it out.

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

9 Things

You’re being trained as an economist in the neo-classical tradition: a little bit in principles, and much more so in this class. That’s not just because of the higher level, but also because the neo-classical paradigm has been the predominant force in overturning Keynesian macro over the last 45 years.

Anyway, Matt Yglesias wrote an article for Vox* entitled “9 Things Only Neoclassical Economists Will Understand”. There’s not much to it, just more of a list, with one-liners.

The thing is, for your purposes, several of those come up in this class each year. Noah Smith, an assistant professor at Stony Brook, has written a follow-up for Bloomberg View entitled “9 Economics Mysteries Explained” (he also blogs at Noahpinion).

Read them both as a way to start getting conversant in what economics students do at higher levels.

* Yglesias is a public intellectual — not an academic, not really a journalist, but someone who writes a lot of highbrow stuff. I guess I’d describe Yglesias him as a liberal who isn’t afraid to criticize the Democrats, or admit the Republicans are right sometimes. Vox is a site that’s kind of half-way between blog and legacy media magazine: big ideas, big name authors, long articles. 

Ridiculously Bad Macro

Newmark’s Door pointed me to this chloropleth from Business Insider:

NACo 4 indicators

Part of what you’re learning in this class is how to separate good macro from bad: and there’s a surprising amount of the latter.

This one’s pretty bad. Orange is the second worst rating here, and Iron and Washington counties get that rating. Yeah. Right.

Now, the whole thing isn’t terrible. It correctly spots the booming oil areas or North Dakota and west Texas. More generally, the plains states more or less skipped the Great Recession, And it picks up that Michigan, Illinois, and Florida are still worse off than other areas.

So what’s gone wrong here?

The first variable they use is “jobs”. This really isn’t specific enough. Anyway, employment is a trending variable. Are they measuring whether a county is above or below trend? Or just up? Have they linearized their measures? This is potentially messy and really wide open. We’ll talk about these issues a lot in February.

Their second variable is the unemployment rate. Using a rate actually may be keeping them out of trouble here. But again, we don’t know how they evaluate that rate: relative to when it peaked? Against some natural rate? More importantly, it’s hard not to see how jobs and the unemployment rate are not highly (negatively) correlated. If so, then they have a collinearity issue. This won’t really make things worse, but it does mean they’re kind’of faking having two pieces of information when they’re really just tracking one.

The same argument can be made about GDP. Presumably they’re using real GDP, but they don’t say that. Here we have the same issues as employment: relative to trend? Gross changes? Is it linearized? And they’ve doubled down on their problem of using jobs with the unemployment rate: it’s highly likely that GDP is collinear with both (which is multicollinearity — that sounds worse, but probably isn’t — in some sense the damage is already done).

The last variable they examine is home prices. At least they were sharp enough to use a median instead of the mean, since that distribution is skewed. Anyway, the economic problem with using this is that rising (falling) prices are both good and bad, depending on whether you ask owners (or potential buyers). No matter how much casual analysts insist that prices matter, they’re usually just a wash. The big problem with the Great Recession wasn’t falling home prices, it was inability of people to make transactions at all (you know, that Q thingie, rather than the P thingie).

In conclusion, this image is poorly done (at best) and misleading (at worst).

Monday, January 19, 2015

Trying to Get a Grip On the Water Balloon

Terry Keyes once passed on a great metaphor to me: some actions are like squeezing a water balloon — the balloon just bulges in some other spot.

This may be what’s going in Europe right now. Russia had trouble, then it moved to Belarus, last week it was in Switzerland, and today it’s in Denmark. Coming next week? Probably some place in eastern Europe like Hungary.*

There’s a number of arguments to link together here, so bear with me.

1) When people are nervous about a country’s future, they try to get their wealth out of it. That means they will give up the local currency at a lower price than they might otherwise (that’s called a depreciation), and will pay a little more for a foreign currency they regard as safe (that’s called an appreciation).

The Eurozone (the 19 countries that use the Euro officially) has had financial troubles of varying magnitudes since the onset of the Great Recession. So people of various Eurozone countries have tried to get their wealth out of the Eurozone, and into a financial institution in some country that’s regarded as safer. There are a lot of possible choices for that, but the big one in Europe is Switzerland — which has had a reputation of safe finance, and capable government, going back for decades.

So, there’s been pressure on the Swiss Franc to appreciate as the Euro depreciates.

2) It’s way too easy, and usually wrong, to make value judgments about price changes. Price changes don’t just happen by themselves: they’re caused by other things. And price changes both help some people and hurt others … every time. Casual analyzers of economic events tend to forget that.

And an exchange rate is a price (of one currency in terms of another). When some foreigner from the Eurozone gets rid of their Euros (so they depreciate) and buys Swiss Francs (so they appreciate) it hurts every foreigner who hasn’t done that yet, and helps every foreigner who did it before.

3) But the Swiss government and central bank care about … the Swiss, not some abstract foreigner from the Eurozone. The appreciation in the value of the Swiss Franc helps every Swiss consumer who imports, but it hurts every Swiss producer who exports. Switzerland is a small country on good terms with rich and populous neighbors, so you could probably change that to just helping every Swiss consumer (since they all import) and hurting every Swiss producer (since they export).

This will lead to political conflict between consumers and producers. My experience is that producers win the battles about exchange rates pretty much every time. So massive pressure for currency appreciation is probably not that popular in Switzerland.

4) There are two ways to run exchange rates for your country: fixed and flexible.

Flexible means you let anyone exchange any currency for your currency privately, and the search for better deals will drive exchange rates. Under flexible exchange, the Swiss Franc would have slowly appreciated.

This is, in fact, what it did do. But the appreciation was so persistent that the Swiss central bank pegged the exchange rate with the Euro in 2011.

Pegging is a form of fixing your exchange rate. What it means is that your central bank will buy or sell their currency, for whatever currency you show up with, at a known and constant rate.

Here’s how this works in practice. Someone lives in a crappy country in the Eurozone, and has some non-liquid wealth that they’re worried about losing. So they sell that for Euros, that are a little less crappy. Then they exchange those for Swiss Francs. And the Swiss national bank is left holding the crappy Euros.

But there’s a common misunderstanding amongst those with control issues. Pegging exchange rates prevents pressure for exchange rates changes from actually changing exchange rates. But it doesn’t dissipate that pressure anywhere. If things don’t change, it can continue to build. The Swiss may have hoped in 2011 that they could hold out and wait until the necessary change took place.

5) It’s naïve to think that because the Swiss central bank can “just print Francs” that this is like buying something for nothing. It isn’t. TNSTAAFL.

Yes, the Swiss central bank now owns big bags of Euros. But what exactly is it going to do with them? Buy stuff in the countries whose residents are trying to get out? Over the last 3 years the Swiss have accumulated as much foreign exchange as much larger Russia supposedly has.

A potentially bigger problem is that you’ve now given a bunch of foreigners the means to buy stuff inside your country, and maybe even to start setting up housekeeping. That prices out the locals in favor of people who may be regarded as carpetbaggers. This isn’t politically viable either.

6) So what we got last Thursday was a massive readjustment of the Franc/Euro exchange rate from the peg that wasn’t viable any more, to a new one they hope will hold (it’s not actually clear if they have a new peg, or a looser zone around some peg, or have gone completely flexible). That adjustment was about 40%. Lots of people are asking around trying to find out if there’s ever been an appreciation that large, but even at this point it’s arguable that it’s unprecedented. (Do note that depreciations that large aren’t uncommon, because most governments are better at screwing up their economies than not).

That makes Swiss consumers and foreigners who’ve obtained Swiss Francs instantly richer, and Swiss producers and the rest of the Eurozone instantly poorer. The hope is that perhaps some of that destabilizing foreign wealth will go back home and snap up the good deals.

7) As of this morning, another thriving country that’s quasi-inside the Eurozone (unlike Switzerland), Denmark, cut its interest rates. This is to discourage foreign money from coming in, because they too are pegged to the Euro.

8) Why is all this happening now? The Swiss National Bank has apparently been tipped off by the European Central Bank that the latter will be going forward with a new policy of quantitative easing.

Quantitative easing has a lot of smoke and mirrors around it, but there are really just two features that even a principles student can understand. The first is that they’ll be buying something other than short-term issues, to try and reduce longer-term interest rate. Second, they’ll be using a quantity target (and letting the interest rate go as low as it needs to) rather than picking the interest rate target (and buying as much as they need to).

The bottom line for Switzerland … and Denmark … and other places that are doing well … is that more Europeans will be bringing their wealth their way. The Swiss probably figured that they didn’t like how the peg had worked out over the last 3 years, and it was going to get worse soon. So they dropped it.

* Why Hungary? Well, really it could be a number of places, like say, Poland. But in Hungary, the mortgage lenders are mostly Swiss banks (because the domestic financial markets are not very thick). Many of the mortgages Hungarians hold are denominated in Swiss Francs, and just got very expensive overnight. Or maybe it will be Croatia, who fixed the value of their currency to the old value of the Swiss Franc within the last hour (and that move is, of course, breathtakingly stupid, since Croatians can now go to their own government to buy Swiss Francs at low exchange rates that they can spend … just about anywhere except Croatia).

Friday, January 16, 2015

Inappropriate Macroeconomic Perceptions

A FOXNews.com poll shows that 64% of respondents say the U.S. is still in recession.

I am writing this in January 2015: our most recent GDP data is for 2014 III, and the recession ended 21 quarters ago in 2009 III.

I can't document this, but I've seen surveys like this over the last few decades, so it's not unusual.

Why are peoples' perceptions so divorced from reality? Here's some thoughts.

  • Maybe people don't know what a recession is?
  • Maybe people are inclined towards pessimism?
  • It is a FOXNews poll. Perhaps the respondents are biased against Obama? (Even so, I don't think that explains the existence of results like this going back for many years).
  • Perhaps their definition of a recession involves knowledge of anyone in their extended network who has been hurt by the economy?
  • Perhaps our threshold for feeling comfortable is higher than an economy is generally capable of achieving?