Saturday, January 9, 2016

Why Don’t We Worry About the Stock Market In Macroeconomics?

The big news the first week of class is the ongoing crash of Chinese stock markets. Here’s an excellent chart that appeared on the front page of Friday’s issue of The New York Times:

NYT 16-01-08 Chinese Stock Prices

Interestingly, the “big” crash of this week is just at the end there. There were actually quite a few of these last summer.

This was a big enough deal that some of the students in class knew the news off the top of their heads. And pretty much everyone in the class was aware of, or believed, the urban myth that stock market crashes cause recessions.*

Now, stock markets are not uninformative about future macroeconomic outcomes. But, like most leading indicators … they’re not really very good on their own, and they don’t improve much when we combine them together. Instead, business cycle peaks and troughs remain highly unpredictable.

The terminology of medical testing is useful here (because most people are familiar with it, but don’t get that it represents some pretty serious underlying statistical thinking). What we’d like to see out of a medical test is (true) positives and (true) negatives. A (true) positive means that the test tells you that you have the disease when you really do. A (true) negative means that the test tells you that you don’t have the disease when you really don’t have it. All tests deliver some true positives and negatives. What differentiates a better test from a worse test is how many false positive and false negatives it has. A false positive means the test says you have the disease when you don’t. A false negative means the test tells you that you’re healthy when you’re not.

The problem with using the stock market as a predictor of the real economy is that it delivers a real lot of false positives and false negatives. Paul Samuelson, who won the Nobel Prize in 1971, said this best in an interview in Newsweek in 1965:

The stock market has forecast nine of the last five recessions.

The bottom line is that you should keep an eye on the Chinese (and other) stock markets, but don’t worry about it too much.

* “Urban myth” is the current slang for this sort of thing. But in economics, when we worry about whether people believe things that may or may not make economic sense, but which don’t have a very solid foundation, we call it “folk economics”. 

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

The Current State of Obamacare (Not Required)

I’ve posted this mostly for curiosity. There isn’t anything in here specifically relevant to the class this semester, but generally speaking the financing of healthcare is a macroeconomic issue (and students are curious about it).

Anyway, a reporter sent big name healthcare wonk (Bob Laszewski) a set of questions, and he posted the answers on his blog Health Care Policy and Marketplace Review.

Whether you’re pro or con, the healthcare market was not really ever well:

… These [Obamacare] structures haven't proven to be any more successful that in the last iteration in the late 1990s. But time will tell and I really hope we can get it right this time and finally find a viable way to get away from fee-for-service reimbursement.

The problem continues to be that people who don’t need healthcare don’t buy insurance for healthcare (as Homer would say “Doh!”):

I worry more about the really poor take-up rates for the healthy people who have not signed up in the 200% of federal poverty level and above brackets than I worry about the percentage of the young who have signed up. Way too much emphasis is put on this age 18-to-35 statistic. Yes, they are more often healthy but under Obamacare the youngest pay one-third the premium of the oldest. We really need the healthy to sign up in much bigger numbers, that have so far been holding out, more than we need the young.

There’s a part missing in that above quote: what Obamacare needs is the older people (who are charged more) but are still healthy (and therefore don’t cost as much) to pay up, so that they can cover the costs of the unhealthy people. But we all know why they don’t do that:

Here is one such comment I got last week: "I have had more people this year weeping and overwhelmed at the astronomical premiums, even WITH subsidies and cost sharing. Many say, 'But that's a mortgage payment."

Just as an FYI, the health insurance premiums SUU pays for my family of four already exceeds my mortgage payment.

The White House is part of the problem:

I have said for some time that the Obama administration by itself could fix much--but not all--of what is wrong with the Obamacare insurance business model if they would just get out of denial and get to work on some practical solutions.

…

… No one in the industry, including me, thinks Obamacare will be repealed. But it needs major repair.

Co-ops, one of the cornerstones of Obamacare, have been collapsing over the last year:

The co-ops proved what can happen when you don't get the list of these things right from the beginning.

… This is just a really bad business plan and they are undercapitalized.

Saying they are in trouble because Republicans cut their risk corridor payments is like saying a derelict boat sank because of a bad storm.

FWIW: the budget Congress passed over the break included wording (attributed to Senator Rubio) that denied increases in the size of that “risk corridor” (the risk corridor is the amount of money Congress allotted to cover the problems in the co-ops).

But, we may be stuck with it:

… Democrats can't admit Obamacare is broken and Republicans can't admit it won't be repealed.

Via Marginal Revolution.

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

Why Is Macro So Hard? Absence of Cognitive Dissonance

We all know what cognitive dissonance is: it’s having two thoughts that are in conflict with each other, and feeling uncomfortable about it because you’re starting to recognize there’s a problem.

Regarding macroeconomics, a lot of people believe things that inconsistent with each other: they don’t seem to have any sense of cognitive dissonance at all. Here’s Mark Perry:
VennDB
He drew this from a post Don Boudreaux made at Café Hayek:
… I had a pleasant if brief conversation with a Danish-American woman. A fair summary of her views about government-provided welfare is the following:

(1) It’s a “right-wing myth” (her term) that generous unemployment and long-term disability compensation payments from government diminishes work effort. “People’s economic decisions are more complicated,” she insisted, than “right-wingers” believe them to be.

(2) A (the?) chief cause of crime is inadequate income. Welfare payments reduce criminal activity.

These two positions are widely held, and are typically held simultaneously by the same person – as, for example, they are held simultaneously by this woman. Yet there is a fierce – although largely unnoticed – tension between (1) and (2). (1) says that people don’t respond very much to monetary incentives; (2) says that people respond very much to monetary incentives. Put differently, according to (1), the prospect of receiving money from government does not significantly diminish the amount of effort people exert to get income from non-governmental sources, while (2) says that the prospect of receiving money from government does indeed significantly diminish the amount of effort people exert to get income from non-government sources.
Either incentives matter, or they don’t. But they can’t matter when it’s convenient to you, and not matter when it isn’t.

Why Is Macro So Hard? Overconfidence

This is related to my earlier post that part of what makes macro so hard is the metacognition deficit of policymakers.
Related to this is an argument set forth by Ram (there’s a primer below the quote):
I'd contend that the main problem in America is that the public, including its highly educated members, is social-scientifically ignorant. Most people I talk to about policy do not even realize that there is anything non-trivial about policy analysis. They want the government to make sure that four phases of rigorously designed RCTs be performed before drugs are made available to the public, for fear of unintended consequences of intervening on a complex system like the human body, yet they think they understand the consequences of highly complex interventions on human societies by introspection alone. Not only do they think they understand the consequences of alternative policy choices, but they're so confident that their understanding is right and that its truth is so obvious that the only explanation for disagreement is evil intentions. When I point out that on virtually every policy issue, at least somewhat compelling arguments for many conflicting points of view have been made by relevant experts, people usually react in disbelief or denial, or immediately retreat to questioning the motives of these experts ("of course they say that, they're on the payroll of Big Business" or whatever). These patterns of speech and behavior are uniformly distributed across the political spectrum, even if intelligence and knowledge of well-established facts is not. Even many experts in particular areas of social science evince no awareness of the lack of expert consensus on almost anything in their field, and give the impression of unanimity to an unknowing public.

My guess is that if you were to convince a supposedly non-utilitarian person that their (e.g.) deontological prescriptions might have terrible consequences, then they would revisit them. Anti-consequentialism is easy to maintain so long as you believe the consequences of your proposals are desirable, but most would fold if convinced otherwise. [the emphasis is not mine]
There’s some highbrow language in here, so let me translate a bit for potential students.

When Ram uses the word “non-trivial” about policy choices, what is meant is that many people think policy choices are trivially easy: this one’s right, that one’s wrong, choose the right one. Does this sound like Donald Trump? When Ram says people don’t recognize that the choices are non-trivial, it means that there are lists of pros and cons that have to be weighed without solid information. It’s not completely guesswork, but some of it might be.

When Ram mentions RCTs, the point is the ridiculous level of testing that for-profit corporations have to go through to “prove” that their medications are safe (even though any yahoo down the road can sell you a poisonous plant and call it a medicinal herb without even having a license).

When Ram mentions introspection, what’s meant is “thinking about it a bit”. For example, Obamacare is an example of multiple “highly complex interventions in human societies”. But how many people do you know that have spent much time thinking about whether Obamacare will work or not, before deciding that they’re for it or against it?

Ram says that many people believe the “truth is so obvious that the only explanations for disagreement is evil intentions.” Is that an argument President Obama has used repeatedly?

Ram writes “if you were to convince a … person that their (e.g.) deontological prescriptions might have terrible consequences, then they would revisit them.” Deontological is college-level word that means that you justify the correctness of your actions because you followed the rules or orders. (You know, that’s the excuse the Germans made about things the Nazis did). The prescriptions are recommended policy actions (just like your doctor might give you recommended medication directions). So, what’s being said here is actually rather hopeful: if you can convince people that the bad policy choice they made was because they were just following orders, they might reconsider it.

Lastly, Ram mentions “anti-consequentialism”. You’ve probably heard the old saw: the ends justify the means. That’s consequentialist: it means that it’s OK to do something bad initially if it ends up good on net. For example, parents call this tough love. To be anti-consequentialist is to think that the means or motivations are all that count: basically, if you think you’re doing good, then you are. Ram is saying that only worrying about motivations rather than consequences (thus, being anti-consequentialist) is an easy viewpoint to stick with if you’re not inclined to ever check the results. At least on Iraq, it’s fair to say the Bush administration was anti-consequentialist. Tie this altogether, and what Ram is saying (and what I’m applying to macroeconomics) is that world is a messy place, with a lot of gray areas, and there are way to many people acting as if the gray areas don’t exist at all.

This appeared in the comments to The Money Illusion, posted by Scott Sumner at EconLog.

First We Screw Up, Then We Have Lunch (On Someone Else’s Tab)

The class spent a lot of Spring 2015 discussing the economic crisis in Greece.

A leading player in that was the Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. He was widely viewed as obstructionist, and unwilling to negotiate seriously with other countries in Europe. Eventually he was fired by his own government.

… Mr Varoufakis infuriated almost all of his European negotiating partners. "We had countless discussions with him," remembered Pierre Moscovici, the European commissioner for economic affairs.

"These discussions were vain, pointless and academic. He only wanted to play for time, not make concrete proposals."

Now he makes a ton of money on the lecture circuit.

An email from an agent of the London Speaker Bureau, published by Proto Thema, an Athens weekly, said that Mr Varoufakis now charges $60,000 (£40,000) for one speech given “outside of Europe”. The sacked minister has a sliding scale of fees, according to the email. Mr Varoufakis will speak anywhere inside Europe for $5,000 (£3,000) – and he will give a university lecture for $1,500 (£1,000).

“The man who contributed to the Greek economy’s catastrophe by obstructing talks with international creditors and leading the country to capital controls is making a mint,” said Proto Thema.

The email reminds anyone thinking of booking Mr Varoufakis that he would also "require business class travel, accommodation, airport and ground transfers, meals and incidentals".

The next time someone asks you why politicians pursue policies for their countries that don’t make economic sense, ask yourself if they may be making economic sense for the politician.

Lovesong for Satoshi Nakamoto Whitepaper [sic]

Learn a tiny little bit about blockchains (and Bitcoin).

Why should a macroeconomist care? OpenBazaar is the most public manifestation of Darknet markets. People with control issues like to think that Silk Road was the end of the story; I view it as the end of the beginning.

Remember, you heard it here first.

When you hear inequality activists like Piketty advocate global wealth taxes, think about why he would be so concerned about getting at wealth that’s gotten beyond particular national borders. When you hear politicians grouse about profits that are not repatriated, think about how they view the world if taxes are their source of funding. When you hear about inversions (Pfizer is currently in the news about this), think about whether physical location is an important as virtual presence.

The macroeconomic news story for the rest of your life is going to be that governments have made expensive promises based on political borders scratched out over the physical world, without recognizing that their tax base is going virtual. Marc Andreessen’s most famous quote is “software is eating the world”. It ate the market for compact discs in less than 5 years. It’s going to eat discretionary government spending over the next generation.

P.S. Not sure why there’s that other stuff appended to the end of the video.

Horrifying Graphic with Useful Information

This is cringeworthy:it’s what happens when you give people better graphing tools than they know how to handle.*

http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/564f70cd8f80c2b9068b47de-1200-831/fdca287a3.jpg
But, it shows some cool data for macroeconomics. What you’re seeing here is GDP growth last year on a city by city basis. Green is better, red is worse. And, because a color wasn’t good enough, we have spikes to show positive growth (but nothing to show negative growth — go figure). Also, recall that GDP growth has to beat population growth for us to feel good about the world: that’s not just green, but more like green with the two palest shades dropped out: so, forget about the southwest. Also, keep in mind that this is just cities, so the white space means nothing.

So, what can we see here? Well, first off, growth is uneven. This is normal. Secondly, there are some places that are actually getting worse. This is also normal: even in the biggest booms, there’s usually a few places lagging behind. Otherwise, we’ve got lots of good, dark green spikes, across the country. There’s a big swatch running from Houston through Seattle that’s doing great. Florida is doing well too. The midwest also seems OK. But, there’s a big arc running from Iowa, down to the central Gulf coast, and back up through Boston that could be doing better.

* The problem(s) with a figure like this are pretty well known. First, don’t tilt the map: that emphasizes the south at the expense of the north. Second, don’t emphasize just half your story (with the spikes). Third, because of the tilt, the height of the spikes is no longer proportional to the actual changes. Fourth, because they tilted it, and used spikes, the bases of the spikes look fatter in the south, distorting perceptions. Lastly, lots of analysis will miss this point (so I’m not picking on this figure specifically anymore), but there isn’t a sense of anything being proportional to population here. Even in 2015, the northeast (taken as a whole) makes California’s population look minute … and there’s no sense of that at all here.

***********************************************************

The day after I wrote the above post, The Wall Street Journal published a similar, and better, graphic. But, they must not want to share it, because it took a lot of internet time (at least 5 minutes) to figure out where they’d hidden away this image. And, of course, they’ve hidden the labels.

But you can still pick up the story. It’s showing the unemployment rate by county, with shades of gray being essentially full employment, and shades of blue being places that could still improve a bit.

I can’t even give you a decent link to this. What I can tell you is that it appeared with the title “Uneven Job Market”. But that’s not really an article, so it’s not clear to me that you’d find that title in Google a few months down the road. It appeared on page A8 of the January 4, 2016 edition.

Via Newmark’s Door.