Thursday, January 14, 2016

I Told You So (not required)

This came from an NPR report about yesterday’s poor performance of U.S. stock markets:

ZARROLI: Well, it was funny, I was watching today and a lot of stock market pundits are now sort of officially talking about recession, using that word. But you don't hear that from economists, really. And it sort of is a reminder of the fact that the stock market is not the same as the economy. I mean, you can have the stock market going down when the economy is not. There's an old saying, the stock market has predicted nine of the past five recessions. [emphasis added]

SHAPIRO: (Laughter).

ZARROLI: You know, so it can go down when the economy is still doing OK, and - but it is something to watch, definitely, …

Earlier in the report, this remark was also made:

… And also, you know, economies all over the world are weakening - too much capacity, not enough demand. You have hot growth countries like China slowing down and then other countries like Brazil entering a deep recession. …

The audio and transcript are here.

Wednesday, January 13, 2016

An “Oh Sh*t Moment”? And the 67% Interest Rate

When planes crash, they listen to the cockpit voice recorder. There’s a dark joke that’s based in fact: a lot of times the last words they here are “Oh ****”. Fill that in with the expletive of your choice.

World financial markets had one of those moments last night in America/this morning in China.

The thing is, a lot of journalists don’t know enough macroeconomics, and neither do their readers. Journalists don’t write about what they don’t know, and they don’t write if their readers don’t know what they’re reading.

So, there is some stuff written about this. It’s a news item today, but it’s not a headline like it should be.

What happened? This morning in Hong Kong (last evening in Utah) a key interest rate was driven up to 67%. It’s back down now, but still a lot higher than normal.

There’s a ton going on here, so let’s review some facts, and how things work in practice.

Banks lend reserves to each other. This is a good practice, that keeps them all liquid. Those loans are mostly overnight — a bank that’s short on reserves one day might be flush with them the next, as deposits and withdrawals are made. Overnight bank to bank loans are very safe, and therefore have a very low interest rate.*

China’s currency has been depreciating. This has gotten to be pretty steady over the last few months: it’s worth less one day than it was before. So, there’s a pattern.

How do currencies depreciate (or appreciate)? Currency markets are huge: global, 24/7, digital and nearly instantaneous, billions of dollars of one currency traded for billions of dollars of another one all to lock in several hundred dollars of profit on a minor advantage. Think about that, a currency trader, fresh out of a place like SUU, working for a big financial firm and making at most $100K per year has to generate about $500 dollars in revenue every day for the firm to cover their salary and benefits — and they have to do that with gigantic trades of other peoples’ money with very thin opportunities.

Why do currencies depreciate? This is tougher. There’s a lot of cash in the world (mostly kept track of digitally rather than physically), and most investors of cash (mostly large financial firms that lend to producers and governments) need to keep several varieties on hand: dollars, renminbi, yen, euros, pounds, and so on. All day long their traders are trying to figure out if they need a little more or a little less of each one. The thing is, they trade one currency for another, because they want all of them in cash all the time. And they also support any sort of non-financial investor that needs to get money into a country to invest there, or out of a country to invest somewhere else. When there are more people trying to get cash out of a country than into it, they will give up more of the currency they’re trying to get rid of for less of the one they want. That’s a depreciation.

What’s going on in China is that, at the gross level cash is flowing in to make investments, at the gross level cash is flowing out so people can make investments elsewhere, and on net the outflows are greater than the inflows, so the value of the currency is dropping. Why would this be happening:? Because it’s fairly easy to see that China isn’t doing very well. That doesn’t mean it’s doing terrible, or will do worse, or anything catastrophic. It just means that relative to other places, it doesn’t look too good right now.

China used to have fixed exchange rates. Now it has flexible exchange rates. When you have fixed exchange rates, the government agrees to honor all exchanges of currency at a constant rate. If you’re country is in good shape, money comes in faster than it leaves. And those people who want to get money in are willing to give up extra, say, dollars, to get fewer renminbi. Because the government is doing those trades, it accumulates dollars and other foreign currencies. That big pile of foreign monies is called foreign exchange reserves (or just foreign exchange). Over the last few decades, China has accumulated a lot of foreign exchange.

But now China has flexible exchange rates, and the game is different.

************************************************************************************

Everything I had ready for class is above the line. This stuff below is all new after class (except for the footnote). I tried to mostly write this post in an order that would seem sensible as you try to figure this all out.

How are flexible exchange rates executed differently than fixed exchange rates? Well, in fixed exchange, one trader is always the government, and they are telling you how much of your currency they’ll take for each unit of theirs. Even if you are trading privately with someone else, you both know that you can always go to the government and get a set price, so you won’t deviate much from that. But, under flexible exchange, the two parties are negotiating, and there’s nothing pinning down the exchange rate … except that both parties know what others are offering, and what was done recently, so they’re not just guessing.

Now, go back to fixed exchange. The government sets the rate. If, at that rate, investors are trying to get their money into the country faster than they are getting out, the government accumulates foreign exchange. But if the investors change direction, the government spends/loses that foreign exchange as they maintain that exchange rate that’s no longer quite right. If things get bad enough, the government can set a new exchange rate (a devaluation), or they can lose their foreign exchange so fast that there’s a crisis.

What China did is play the fixed exchange rate game well over the last few decades (and accumulated foreign exchange). Then they switched to flexible exchange, and were probably hoping they’d get to keep all that foreign exchange (and maybe even spend it on something else).

Except that now China has flexible exchange, and the only way to keep an exchange rate that’s flexible at some value you find desirable is to buy and sell in the foreign exchange market just like any other trader.

So, the point that Shan made in class that China has a target for the exchange rate is true, but it’s only sensible to have a target if you have the foreign exchange to keep your exchange rate near that target. China does. For now. But no country has enough foreign exchange to do that forever. The policy discussion inside at the top in China is 1) should we keep letting our currency depreciate (which has pluses and minuses), or 2) do we spend some of this foreign exchange we were saving for a rainy day … because now the rainy day is here.

In sum, China has flexible exchange rates right now, but flexible means they can go both ways on their own, and China doesn’t like the way the exchange rates are moving … and they can slow that down or stop it by acting like they have rates that are more fixed, but it’s going to cost them.

It’s time to start tieing all this together.

Now, on to Hong Kong. Hong Kong still operates somewhat separately from the way the rest of China does. And because of it’s colonial history, location, and wealth, Hong Kong is a financial center for all of Asia and China in particular. So, banks and financial firms in Hong Kong are the ones making most of the overnight loads of reserves denominated in Chinese currency.

And there’s more investors trying to get money out of China than in, and they’re doing most of this through Hong Kong.

And maybe we’re starting to see some herd behavior that might lead to an asset bubble. This would happen if investors are not trying to get out of China because their business fundamentals have gotten worse, but because they’re following the herd of others trying to get their money out of China. We usually think of asset bubbles as situations where the prices are going in one directoin irrationally. You never know for sure, but maybe there’s some of this going with China’s exchange rate right now. The thing is, even if the price movements are irrational, a rational trader can still make money off of them. And, if a rational trader is doing the same thing as the herd of irrational traders, then the irrational traders are encouraged to keep doing what they’re doing.

This brings us to short trading. A short trade is where you pay someone a little money now to borrow their asset, with the promise to return it at some set date in the future. It helps if the asset is fungible (this means that you don’t have to return the exact same unit of the asset, but can repay with some other unit of the asset — so dollar bills are an example of a fungible asset). How do you make money off of a short trade? Basically, it’s a bet that the price of the asset is going to go down. Because what you do is borrow the asset, and immediately sell it, then buy it back later on when its price is lower, and pocket the difference.

So if the value of the renminbi is falling day after day, you can make money short trading. To do this, you’d borrow others renminbi today, trade those for some other currency, then tomorrow you’d buy cheaper renminbi, and pay off your loan.

And, who’s loaning renminbi? Banks in Hong Kong with excess reserves. Normally they loan those to other banks, but if they can loan them to a currency trader and get more money for them, then why not?

Journalists and bureaucrats like to call this speculation. I think that’s nasty. They’re trying to tack a moral cost on to a smart business transaction.

And what is that smart transaction? It’s using the Hong Kong banks as a source of funds to short the renminbi because — irrational or not — a lot of investors are trying to get out of China. These traders are just trying to get into China today so they can get out tomorrow too. It’s not immoral, but it’s certainly not typical (which can make it easier to convince people with your sketchy claim that it is immoral).

Now another player has come into this market. Here’s the players:

  • Banks with excess reserves, who trade with banks with insufficient reserves, to be paid pack with reserves tomorrow (plus a little extra). That little extra they pay back is expresses as an interest rate.
  • Banks with excess reserves, who trade with currency traders who give them a little extra of something desirable today (like dollars), to pay them back the same amount of reserves tommorow.
  • Banks with excess reserves, who trade with the government of China who gives them a little extra of something desirable today (like foreign exchange), to pay them back the same amount of reserves tommorow.

What China has done is change the word “little” in the third bullet point to “a whole lot more” to outbid the currency traders in the second bullet point. This means the banks who are short on reserves in the first bullet point have to pay a lot more back tomorrow (which is expressed as a higher interest rate). China can keep doing this as long as they either want to spend their foreign exchange reserves, or as long as they have foreign exchange reserves to spend.

This is kind of like a pack of dogs fighting a bear. The dogs have annoyed the bear, and it just swatted them really hard. The bear won this round. Does that mean it will win the fight? Simon Rabinovitch, from Boston University had a good tweet summing this up:

Better for a central bank to be feared or respected? China opts for the former …

This next bit will sound a little vacuous, but it’s true: governments always win foreign exchange fights until they lose. The thing is, government officials tend to think they’ll never lose. Which is why depreciations often lead to crises. I’ll be quoting from here down from this piece at Seeking Alpha (they may want a free registration, and I would not worry about doing that).

Central banks trade short-term outbreaks of calm for long-run continued problems of inefficiency and imbalance. Market forces, including speculation, is trying to trade short run disorder and turmoil, sometimes very nasty, in order to find a more suitable long-run balance.

Is this an “oh sh*t” moment? Who knows. Here’s what we do know.

  • There are problems in the non-financial part of China’s economy.
  • This is leading to problems in the financial part of China’s economy.
  • The financial sector is nimbler than just about any non-financial industry, so the problems snowball more quickly.
  • There probably is some short trading being funded through otherwise normal banking in Hong Kong.
  • Traders making rational moves are being labeled as speculators.
  • China’s government made a big play targeted at those traders, and didn’t care if it hurt banks that were short on reserves in the process.

A big picture insight that you won’t get until you kinda’ sorta’ understand this whole post, is that the government of China is unlikely to have taken that last step unless it had taken a lot of other steps targeted at the top of the list … and given up on them.

If the PBOC [i.e., China’s central bank] was desperate last week, the catalog of words describing their likely stance this week is unbelievably short (pun intended). In the handbook of central bank operations, when conditions truly spiral out of control, the first entry in that chapter says to blame speculators. Primary among them, subchapter one in the handbook, are the short sellers.

… amount to are acts of proclaimed exhaustion; the central bank or central financial authority has no other options left …

This relates to the post from earlier this week that Xi Jinpeng and his administration may be micromanagers that are being overtaken by events they can’t handle.

In attacking the speculative aspects of these currency repressions, central banks never answer the question that should be addressed from the very start: why are speculators "attacking" in the first place? … Speculation is but one mechanism by which imbalance is brought back to a steady state. It is a violent, messy and disorderly method, but cuttingly effective which is why short speculation makes for such a good, public target.

For now, this move seems to have worked. Sometimes that happens. Sometimes not.

Do you see now why this is not a big news item? It’s not easy to figure out. If you want to keep up on it, you can go to Google, put in “hibor” as your search term, then click on the “News” link at the top, and see what’s new.

* Do note that the rate did not go up to 67%/day, so that you borrow 100 today and repay 167 tomorrow. Instead, that 67% is per year, and is calculated as what you’d get if you could get that overnight rate for 365 days in a row, and compounded it each day. It’s good practice to work out what the rate per day actually was.

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

How Much Should We Trust GDP Data?

I wouldn’t say it’s normal for me to start out a semester by trashing GDP, or by picking on a particular country like China. But, I did.

It’s well-known amongst macroeconomists that many countries’ data is less than accurate.

It turns out there a service that actually keeps track of this. Of course, it can’t tell you a better number for a country’s GDP (because asserting that it’s innaccurate is different from knowing what is accurate).

World Economics, a consulting firm based in London, publishes the Data Quality Index for GDP (along with quite a bit of other interesting and unusual data).

Their index weights 5 factors that affect the quality of GDP measurement: 1) how often the base year is updated, 2) how up-to-date are their accounting standards, 3) how big is their informal economy, 4) per capita real GDP (as a proxy for how well-funded government statisticians are), and 5) corruption.

Who’s the best? Switzerland. America is # 2 (we’re below Switzerland because we’re a little more corrupt). China is in the middle of the pack; the biggest contributor to their low rank is corruption.

Sunday, January 10, 2016

What’s the Recent Labor Market History?

This graphic is an interesting way to summarize how labor markets have done over the last 15 years:

WSJ 16-01-11 Employment Charts

Unfortunately, like a lot of infographics that emphasize cool over utility, there are som pitfalls. In particular, people are predisposed to thinking higher is better, and the yellow and red ribbon shows a decidedly mixed message if that’s what you’re inclined to think. But … maybe not.

In principle, what you’re seeing here is a cool idea. Take the numbers from each year, and rank them from best (at the top), to worst (at the bottom). Then put a number of series side-by-side, to increase data density. Lastly, tie it all together by highlighting the current year (although doing that in warning colors of bright yellow and red is … problematic).

On the left, the job gain numbers are pretty good. They should be adjusted for the fact that the population is a little larger today than it was in the earlier years. This would tend to move the more recent years down a bit. Also, this is job gains relative to the year before. It’s really easy to gain jobs when the economy is coming out of a deep hole, so putting the recent years above those from a decade ago (when we were expanding out of a much milder recession that created less slack) may not be appropriate.

Second from the left is the unemployment rate. The number we have right now is pretty good, and we should feel good about that. Having said that, we’re too quick to forget that Bush beat the current number twice.

That panel should be compared with the one that is second from the right (the fact that they are not right next to each other is a tip off that what you’re seeing here is a victory of artistry over relevance). Anyway, this panel shows that for those people in prime working age, we don’t have as much participation as we used to. (Also note that there are some typos in the dates on this figure: 2005-08 are mislabeled and mixed in with the 2002-03 numbers). Also, we hear some stuff (correctly) that labor force participation is down because baby boomers are retiring: that is correct, but that’s not what’s shown here. Instead, this is something called the labor force to population ratio. How is that unemployment and that ratio are down at the same time? It’s telling us that some people aren’t that interested in working (note that there is no moral judgement there about whether that’s a good thing or not). The way to think about those two numbers is that of the population that should be working, about 80% of them want to work, and of that 80%, about 5% of those are unemployed. But given that the 80% figure is off a couple of points from where it has been, it means that the unemployment rate would be higher if those people were more interested in working.

In the middle is real GDP growth, and the story here is not so good. Only the growth in 2003 (at the very top) is “strong” for the U.S.

Lastly, I’ll discuss the panels on wage growth and inflation. There are two pitfalls here. First, they should be next to each other so we can compare them. Secondly, the yellow and red ribbon going downward might make the casual reader think that somehow low inflation is a bad thing. Of course, that’s idiotic … but like I said, this is a victory of artistry over understanding. Anyway, what we want is for wage growth to exceed inflation. So these two panels tell us that 2015 was a pretty good year. This is what we would have liked to have seen over the last several years, and that was a reason why people felt so lousy about the recovery back then. Unfortunately, there’s more bad editing here, so some of the years are mislabeled, and it’s hard to tell which ones were comparable to this past one.

This is drawn from an article entitled “Hurdles Persist Despite Job Gains” that appeared in the January 9 issue of The Wall Street Journal.

“Almost Comical Ineptitude”

One additional concern about Chinese economic performance over the last couple of years is micromanagement.

The lessons macroeconomics can offer politicians and bureaucrats are few and far between. The one thing we know for sure is that there are far more governments who have pulled their economies downwards than there are ones that have pushed their economies upwards. The textbook political advice sounds a lot better on paper than it works in practice.

Which brings us to my recent series of posts on China. In China, they change the group at the top every ten years. They claim to rule by consensus, but who’s at the top still matters. They’ve had Xi Jinpeng for just over 3 years now. And what we’ve learned is that Xi appears to have control issues.

Here is Andrew Browne, from an opinion column in the January 9 issue of The Wall Street Journal entitled "Xi Jinping’s Micromanaging Leaves Markets in the Lurch":

A defining characteristic of Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, is his controlling personality.

Mao reigned with godlike aloofness. Deng Xiaoping left the details to underlings. Mr. Xi, by contrast, takes charge of everything; he’s an inveterate micromanager.

Amid the mayhem of China’s markets this week, one dysfunction stands out: bureaucratic confusion. …

Part of the problem, it seems, is a policy-making bottleneck. Mr. Xi has reversed a collective-type leadership process inherited from Mr. Deng and concentrated decision-making authority in his own hands.

But he’s thinly stretched.

For the last couple of decades, the # 1 guy in China has run the politics, and the # 2 guy has run the economy. Not now:

As a consequence, Premier Li Keqiang’s job has shrunk. His immediate predecessors ran the economy; he doesn’t enjoy the same autonomy. If things go seriously wrong, though, he might end up as a convenient scapegoat. Other highly competent economic leaders look less like decision makers and more like cheerleaders for policy concocted above their heads.

Do note this is the same Li Keqiang mentioned in my other post as known for not trusting the GDP numbers produced by his own government. Maybe he was on to something.

Recall that I noted this was an opinion piece. He echoes what I said in class on Friday:

Conventional analysis holds that the Chinese stock market doesn’t have much connection to the underlying economy, and therefore the wider world shouldn’t be too worried about the latest gyrations.

But this misses the point. Investors have a right to feel concerned …

Note that his tone is a little different than mine: he’s saying investors should be concerned, but he didn’t say that macroeconomists should be. But then the author gets serious:

Instead, we’ve seen almost comical ineptitude, the most recent example being the introduction of circuit breakers to reduce volatility in the stock market.

The measure had been fast-tracked by the securities regulator after the stock-market wobbles made Mr. Xi look more vulnerable than at any time since coming to power in 2012. But the circuit breakers had to be abandoned after only four days—because they made volatility much worse.

“It’s Amateur Hour!” writes the Shanghai-based economist Jonathan Anderson of the Emerging Advisors Group.

…

The regulatory confusion reflects a contradiction at the heart of Chinese economic policy making, one that has Mr. Xi’s stamp all over it. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership wants efficient markets to help pull China through the transition to consumer-led growth. Yet Beijing doesn’t really trust free markets and prefers guiding them with regulation.

It’s these bureaucratic interventions, poorly conceived and badly implemented, that now threaten the most damage.

None of this is a guarantee that China will go into a long stall. But, the whole reason macroeconomists bring this sort of thing up is that there are quite a few countries that have gone into long stalls when they hit a middle income level of development comparable to where China is right now (just look at Brazil’s slow moving trainwreck this year with everyone watching the countdown to the Olympics in Rio this summer). The relatively smooth sailing that, say, South Korea did going through this phase a generation ago is the exception not the norm.

Saturday, January 9, 2016

What Should We Be Worrying About In China (and India Too)?

China’s economy is the second or third biggest in the world (don’t believe anyone who says it is currently larger than America’s, and it’s reasonable to be suspicious that it’s larger than Japan’s).

One of the many problems with China’s macroeconomy is that the official data is systematically overstated. This is problem is well-known to economists (probably the best source on this is a blog called Balding’s World, which posts about overstatement of Chinese economic performance every few weeks). Do note that I’m not saying that China isn’t doing OK, just that it’s foolish to believe the official numbers.

Surprisingly, it’s even known to high ranking officials in the Chinese government.

No less than the second in command of China, the Premier Li Keqiang, has stated that Chinese GDP data is unreliable and “man-made”. To put this in perspective, the current Premier of China, second in command for the entire country, leading economic policy formulation, a Phd in economics, having spent essentially all his career inside public administration in various posts throughout China advises you not to trust GDP figures …

Li has even recommended that people look at highly disaggregated data, like electricity usage. When you do, the picture is not that rosy.

China is not the first country to do this. A lot of militarism by the United States during the Cold War is not attributed to the fact that our CIA was not sufficiently critical of the announced economic statistics coming out of the Soviet Union.

And, just this past week, news came out that India is gaming its GDP numbers too (because it wants to be seen as being as important as China).

In the end, I’m not saying we should throw out the GDP numbers of various countries, or that fraud is widespread. I am saying that some suspiciousness is always warranted. For most developed countries, there’s zero evidence of fraud. But, if it’s a less-developed country where you’re suspicious of the government or leaders to begin with, perhaps you should be suspicious of the numbers too. It’s no different than asking a kid how tall they are (where they almost always overstate their height), or a dieter how much weight they’ve lost: if you’re trying to change, improve, or catch-up, there’s a very common human tendency to overstate your success.

So, should we be worried about China (or India)? I think the answer is yes. These are big economies, and they haven’t been performing too well the last couple of years. Keep an eye on commodity prices. For example, we’ve seen the price of oil drop by over 50% over the last couple of years. Most of that is from the development of horizontal drilling (and less importantly, fracking) in the U.S. But don’t fool yourself that this isn’t covering up for weak demand from China. If that isn’t convincing, look at other commodity prices. They’re all dropping, while the U.S. is expanding, and Europe and Japan are holding steady. The demand of someone big must be off, and who’s left? China. India, Brazil. Russia.

The Gambler’s Fallacy and the Chinese Stock Market Crash of 2015

Innumeracy is pretty common.

One example of this is commonly called the gambler’s fallacy. It goes like this: if you make one bet and go up by 60%, bet it all on a second bet and lose 40%, most people think you’re actually ahead. The fallacy is that you’re not.

Think about it: suppose you start with $100. Your first bet wins you $60, so you now have $160. On the second bet you lose 40% of that, or $64. Subtract that out, and you have $96. You’re down 4% over the two bets.

What goofs people up is the inclination to take an arithmetic average of net growth rates, rather than a geometric average of gross growth rates. In this case, the net growth rates are +60% and –40%. Average them together and you get +10%. The arithmetic is correct, but it’s the wrong method to use for growth rates. Instead you should multiply the gross growth rates. These are +160%, and 60%. Multiply them and you get 96%.

A ton of what we’re going to do for the rest of the semester has to do with dealing with growth rates properly, so this is an excellent and easy example.

AND, it showed up in graphical form in that chart of stock prices from the front page of Friday’s issue of The New York Times. Check it out:

NYT 16-01-08 Chinese Stock Prices

If you’d put 100 into the Shanghai exchange in January 2015, you’d have had about 160 by June, and you’d be back down to a little below 100 by January 2016.