Thursday, October 24, 2024

Why Is Macro So Hard? (Here We Go Again) Another Economist Who Isn't an Economist At All

OpenAI has hired their first Chief Economist.

That person is Aaron Chatterji, a professor from the business school at Duke.

His CV is available on online. Here's some highlights:

  • He was a member of the National Economic Council in the Biden White House (that's the office that's mostly attorneys)
  • He was Chief Economist at the Department of Commerce (you'd think they might know better)
  • He was a member of the Council of Economic Advisors in the Obama White House (OK, that's good)
  • At Duke, he's listed as a Professor of Strategy in their business school. BTW: Duke has a Department of Economics (full of economists), but it's not in their business school.
  • He held a visiting position at Stanford where the title was Professor of Public Policy
  • He got a Ph.D. from Berkeley in "Business and Public Policy"
  • He got a  BA in economics from Cornell.
  • Of his 33 journal articles, the most popular venue (by far) is Strategic Management Journal.

What's my point in all this? I'm pointing out a weird conjunction of events: a general feeling that the economy is not doing well, along with a propensity to put people in charge of economic decisions who aren't economists. If everyone always felt the economy was doing OK, I don't think this would be a problem. As it is, it seems like a red flag to me: why is it so important to call people economists when they aren't?

Tuesday, October 15, 2024

Why Is Macro So Hard? Another "Economist" Who Isn't an Economist At All

This one is pretty hard to believe.

But there it was in the Wall Street Journal: "The Economist Whose Contrarian Streak Has Gotten Attention in Biden and Trump Camps".

Pettis isn’t a trained economist. He describes himself as “a finance guy,” ...

Now, my own biases may be creeping in here, but I think a lot of the fascination of the press with Wall Street types borders on parasitic (or worse, but this is a family blog). 

Anyway, it's a fact. So as an economics student, please put on your tinfoil hat when anyone ... I repeat ANYONE ... starts implying that people involved in buying and selling assets have special insight to macroeconomics.

A career on Wall Street ... worked in the bond divisions of investment banks Bear Stearns and First Boston. 

And for 20+ years he's been an finance professor at a very good university in China. Without actually having a degree in finance (he has an MBA with a focus in finance, and a Masters of International Affairs).† His Wikipedia page notes that he was a bond trader ... so basically ... he started in sales.

Oh ... and a punk rock music producer and night club owner in China.

Who sings this guys praises? Well, the article quotes Robert Lighthizer, Trump's first term trade representative. Again ... the problem is ... Lighthizer is an attorney, not an economist (seemingly not even a undergraduate major). And Oren Cass (another non-economist who plays one on TV) whom I trashed in the immediately preceding post. Go figure. Oh, and Katherine Tai, Biden's current trade representative, who happens to be an attorney (and definitely has zero economics training as an undergraduate or graduate student).

Who  doesn't? Well they quote Maurice Obstfeld, who's a likely winner of a Nobel Prize in the next 10 years or so for his work in trade.

“The world is really complicated. For Michael Pettis, the world is really simple,” said Maury Obstfeld ...

Maury? Can't say I've heard that before.

***

For the umpteenth time in my career ... there is nothing wrong with having opinions about macroeconomics ... and no requirement that one have any background in economics ... but the analogy here is that we keep getting told to pay attention to what the assistant basketball coach has to say about modern dance.

Macro is hard. And macroeconomists are wrong about it all the time. But articles like this don't even note that we probably a bit of an edge on this topic.

FWIW: the article is written by 2 Wall Street Journal reporters, and at least one of them did major in economics as an undergraduate.

† Do note that this sort of background would not qualify Pettis to get a tenured or tenure-track job in a finance department in an AACSB accredited school, although his experience and two books would probably be enough to keep him as qualified lecturer once he had his foot in the door.

Thursday, October 3, 2024

What Populists Don't Know, But Economists Do

I am writing this a few weeks before the 2024 election. Both Presidential campaigns have taken populist stances that display a lot of ignorance about how macroeconomies work. Good luck with that.

For his part, Trump is doubling down on the tariffs he deployed while President, and proposing new tariffs that are more comprehensive, and often bigger.

The article entitled "What populists don't understand about tariffs (but economists do)" goes over some of the magical thinking underlying support for these plans.

Most of this piece is a response to a piece by Oren Cass in The Atlantic, who pushes the net benefits of the proposed tariffs. Cass has been involved in conservative political policy circles for the last 15 years. And, as noted in my post about Harris' economic team ... he's another person that presents themselves as a macroeconomics expert ... without having much economics background. Cass was a political economy major (whatever that non-standard degree entails) at Williams College (a small, northeastern, liberal arts school). Then he went to Harvard Law School. He also worked for Bain; so he's smart and ambitious, but again business consulting is not macroeconomics. He also worked for Romney's campaigns, and for conservative think tanks.

The authors hit Cass' position early and hard:

... An assessment of tariffs as a policy tool must answer three questions:

  • How costly are tariffs?
  • Would they deliver the desired benefits?
  • Would other policy tools be more effective than tariffs?

Our brief answers are:

  • Very.
  • Negligibly or no.
  • Yes.

If Trump wins the election, you should definitely read the whole thing. 

If Harris wins and proposes tariff policies (because it's not like her campaign has not already copycatted Trump campaign proposals), you should definitely read the whole thing.

Saturday, August 24, 2024

Economically Ignorant Policy Proposal Is Amongst the First from the Harris Campaign

I don't blame Harris. I blame her advisors.

And never forget that I hate Trump, so this isn't just grousing.

And I don't hate non-economists having opinions about economic issues. I do wish they would be less vocal about things they don't know.

***

Anyway, Trump offered up a policy to stop taxing tips. 

Nominally, you always had to pay taxes on tips. But no one reported them. Easy to do if the tip was cash you put in your pocket.†

But you and I probably do this really rude thing: we include a tip when we tap our card. The thing is, that payment goes to the bank, then to the employer, who then forwards the tip to the employee. That makes these very easy to track. And tax. If the employers chose to report the tips; which many of them didn't since they viewed it as a pass-through.

Under one of the first fiscal policy measure to address CoVid (the CARES Act of March 2020), an Employee Retention Credit was created. This allowed for a business to offset (importantly, that is a much bigger deal than a write-off) taxes due, and perhaps receive money back (importantly, that is not a refund) if they could show their revenue was down from CoVid. This credit went to the business to help their bottom line, but in turn they had to pass a portion of the credit on to employees whose pay had been cut. This all sounds good. But, for good or bad, employers were allowed to count the tips they knew about (from credit card swipes) to make themselves more eligible for the credit. Basically, in helping service workers out they made it more likely their tips would be taxed. Oof. On the brighter side, there was a limit on the size of the claim per employee of $10K, so if you made a lot of tips, most of them could still go untaxed.

But, policymakers sell themselves by providing new "programs" or extending or expanding existing ones. So in the fourth fiscal policy to address CoVid (the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) the Democrats included an expansion of the Employee Retention Credit. A tiny little expansion of about ... oh ... 550% in the amount that could be paid out. Or potentially a 550% increase in the amount of one's tips that might now be taxed.

By the time this came up for a vote, there was no longer bipartisan support for CoVid fiscal relief: a lot of money had already been allocated, bunches of it hadn't even been spent yet, and there were fears (that turned out to be correct) that the economy had returned to full employment and further stimulus would be inflationary. The bill passed the Democratically controlled house, but deadlocked at 50-50 in the Senate. The Vice President can cast the tie-breaking vote, and Harris did. 

To sum up, she voted to tax more tips.

Then, inexplicably, one of her first policy proposals as a candidate was to promise to not tax tips. Even though this was already Trump's policy.

***

Here's the thing: not taxing tips is internally consistent with the view Republicans typically hold about labor markets, and is inconsistent with how Democrats typically view labor markets. How so?

Consider the minimum wage. This is a form of (binding) price floor. The textbook argument is that price floors are not a good idea. There are several reasons, but one is that you can't force demanders to make purchases at the floor price, so some supply goes unsold, and surpluses appear that were not there before.

Now, the labor market is backwards from most peoples' initial intuition: employers are the demanders, and employees are the suppliers. Price floors help suppliers, and the minimum wage can do the trick.

But then you run into another issue. The qualitative answer in textbooks is that some workers may lose their jobs when the minimum wage rises, since the price floor may make demanders drop out of the market. So the higher wage would only help the people who kept their jobs, but would hurt those that lose them.

Except, quantitatively, it's not clear how big that effect is. If demand is inelastic, almost no one loses their job. If demand is elastic, lots of people will lose their jobs. 

Politicians aren't actually much for hard evidence. So generally, Democrats just presume that the demand for minimum wage workers is inelastic so that minimum wage increases are beneficial to workers, and Republicans presume it's elastic so that minimum wage increases are harmful to workers. Hold that thought.

Consider tax incidence. This is who actually pays the tax (directly or indirectly) rather than who the tax is targeted at. A basic conclusion is that taxes are most incident on whomever has a more inelastic curve (because inelasticity means you can't change much, even to avoid a tax).

For example, suppose your political position is that fast food is bad and we need to discourage it. And your policy is to tax McDonald's employees (lower take home pay, so less workers, so slower food, and customers stay away). If labor demand is inelastic, that means that McDonald's can't go without employees, and eventually they will end up paying the tax for their employees so they don't go work at the hardware store.

OK, now, for good or ill, tips are currently taxed a lot more than they uses to be. So a policy to stop taxing them is like an anti-tax (or subsidy).

This makes a lot of sense if you're Trump and you view labor demand as elastic: most of the benefit of subsidizing workers by not taxing their tips will go those service workers. 

But this makes no sense if you're Harris and you view labor demand as inelastic: most of the benefit of not taxing tips will go to the employers of those service workers.

I think it's plausible that Harris' economic advisors (a group with zero actual economists) did not catch this blunder. I also think it's possible that they don't care; although this requires a cynical presumption on my part that they think the voters they're likely to attract with it are stupid.

And I absolutely get that economics can be difficult, and boring, and that no one should have to understand it if they don't want to. But having said that, I think that makes a strong case for using economic advisors that know their economics. I think potential voters trust their politicians to at least be able to do that. 

Or not: it's been about 2 weeks now, and the Harris campaign has not changed their proposal.

***

For what it's worth, I had a conversation with ChatGPT about Harris' positions and it quickly noted the inconsistency. So, in principle, all Harris' advisors had to do was type a bit if they were concerned about economically sensible policy. Do note that ChatGPT is not current enough to know about Harris' positions, so I did have to input them on my own and ask it how they meshed.

† Confession: I worked for tips in the 80s, which were all in cash, and I did not report them.

Why Is Macro So Hard? What Passes for Economic Advice (Kamala Harris Campaign Edition)

Shortly before the Democratic National Convention, Kamala Harris started to announce some economic policy plans. More on the plans in another post (probably just above/after this one).

***

Disclaimer 1: I am not a Harris fan.

Disclaimer 2: I do not like Trump either. The unusual thing about me, relative to others you may know with a negative view of Trump, is that mine go back much further. I grew up in the state of New York, where Trump was often in the news, and have disliked just about everything about Trump since ... probably 1983 or 1984. So yeah, I'm biased, but I don't have TDS, and I'm accused fairly often of supporting him (which is grating).

***

Anyway, the Harris campaign is demonstrating something that is a problem for both parties. It's a development over the last 15-25 years. And it tends to be worse for the Democrats.

A related point is that there is no certification for being an economist or economics advisor. If you see a CPA on TV, you can be almost certain they're an accountant. If you see an economist on TV ... you should do some digging.

The first mention that I read or heard of Harris actually having collected some economic advisors came in the piece entitled "Kamala Harris’s Economic Team and Agenda Start to Take Shape" [sic] which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on August 14. I dived right in.

You have to read until the 14th paragraph before they name names. Probably a reason for that.

Do note that this came out before the blow up about Ms. Harris proposing widespread price controls. That was probably in the works at that time. They're focus then was "... making housing more affordable, lowering costs for families, taking on corporate excess and boosting small businesses ...".

First, a few notes. 

  • The NEC noted below is for National Economic Council. This is a White House office created under the Clinton administration as a substitute for the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). The latter is staffed by economists. The former is staffed by political aides and advisors. The CEA was established in 1946 when the U.S. (and other countries) first started adopting intentional macroeconomic policies that were largely Keynesian.
  • Degrees in public policy or social policy typically come from schools or colleges within universities entitled something like school of public policy. Schools of social policy are rarer, and have more of a sociology focus. In both the focus is on policy. In some, one can graduate without ever having taken a class in economics (where we do this thing where we differentiate good policies from bad ones).
  • In the U.S., law students are generally not required to take classes in economics at all, although some schools have electives. It was considered really radical in 1989 when my friend Harry Butler first started offering economics for continuing education credit to Federal judges.

So here's the list of advisors:

  • Brian Nelson, lawyer from Yale, unknown BA from UCLA, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (personal note, financial intelligence does not sound friendly)
  • Mike Pyle, lawyer from Yale, unknown BA from Dartmouth, Deputy National Security Advisor for Internal Economics under Biden, Harris' 2020 campaign's economics advisor, member of the NEC under Obama (personal note, I wonder why the NSA needs someone who works on economics inside the country)
  • Brian Deese, lawyer from Yale, BA in Poli. Sci. from Middlebury, director of the NEC under Biden
  • Gene Sperling, lawyer from Yale, BA in Poli. Sci. from Minnesota, member of the NEC under Biden, Director of the NEC, and attorney for the Secretary of the Treasury under Obama, director of the NEC under Clinton
  • Deanne Millison, lawyer from Harvard, unknown BA from Washington University in St. Louis, liason between Harris and the NEC
  • Rohini Kosoglu, long time Harris advisor, MSP (masters of social policy) from George Washington, unknown BA from Michigan, domestic policy advisor in the Biden White House, aide to three different senators
  • Grace Landrieu, member of the NEC, MA in Public Policy from the Kennedy School at Harvard, BA in Government from Georgetown, with a minor in Economics
  • Bharat Ramamurti, a lawyer from Yale, with an unknown undergraduate major, former deputy director of the NEC, and former aide to Senator Warren

That's a list of lawyers, with only a single econ minor in the bunch.

I am a firm believer that a President or candidate should be able to choose who they want, and within broad latitude get them approved and working ASAP. 

Having said that, the choice of appointees tells us something about the candidate or President. 

And the pattern I see here is that Harris and her team don't think you need any background in economics to do economic policy.

Good luck with that.

By analogy, I wish the voters knew that the dance recital was being planned by the football coaches.

In the future, when we try to fathom why a Harris policy proposal makes no economic sense, this may be part of the reason.

Sunday, August 4, 2024

Tin Foil Hat Time (Venezuela Edition)

The New York Times has gotten all sorts of bad press this week. This is over an article entitled "Venezuela's Autocrat Is Declared Winner In Tainted Election".

If you don't know the word autocrat ... it's a fancy way of saying dictator.

And it's disingenuous to claim that "... Autocrat Is Declared Winner ..." when the only people who declared that were the autocrat himself, and the government that works under him.

But these are minor points for economists. The real sticking point comes in this quote:

... In recent years, the socialist model has given way to brutal capitalism, economists say, with a small state-connected minority controlling much of the nation’s wealth.

Basically, this is just a bold lie. The problem with that is that if it's repeated enough, some people will start to believe it.

The backstory here is that Venezuela ... then the richest country in Latin America ... took a hard turn towards socialism in the late 90s. The autocrat noted above (Maduro) is the hand-picked successor to the autocrat who started the whole mess (Chavez). So really what we see in Venezuela is a three decade experiment with socialism.

It has not been pretty. And in some ways the Venezuelan government has relaxed its control over the economy in recent years. But this is mostly to help out politically connected friends. 

The article asserts that this is "brutal capitalism". No, it isn't. There's very little capitalist about it (which usually entails private ownership of capital and freely moving prices). But there is a name for a system in which the politically approved are allowed to exercise power, and make profits from the limited size of their well-connected group. The name for this is fascism (in the traditional sense, not the distorted convenience usage popular in the U.S. over the last decade). Better parallels for Venezuela's current situation would be Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar, Argentina under Peron, and so on. Paragons of capitalism they are not.

Oh ... and did you not the sleight of hand there ... the article writes "economists say" but doesn't actually quote any economists who do say this. Hmm.

One is left to think that the intended target for this article is people who don't understand what capitalism is, don't understand what fascism was, and are in denial about the track record of socialism.

It's been ages since I wrote anything this harsh ...

Has a Recession Begun?

Forecasting turning points is notoriously difficult (anecdotally, it is considered to be the most studied problem in human history, and it's still studied because no one can do it well). 

Very complex rules don't show much improvement, so many people don't bother. Simple rules have the advantage that people can follow them.

Real time rules are also important. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee does just that — it dates peaks and troughs. But it does so many months after the fact, which isn't very useful for policy.

Claudia Sahm, who was formerly an economist with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, developed a simple rule (data from FRED) that's been popular over the last decade or so.

According to that rule, the U.S. economy just peaked.

Her rule has two parts. First calculate the average employment rate over the last 3 months. Second, find the lowest monthly unemployment rate in the last 12 months. If the first is higher than the second, we're in a recession.

In the current case, the average of the last 3 months (4.0%, 4.1%, and 4.3%) is 4.13%. The lowest rate in the last 12 months is 3.5% in July 2023. Do note that the last 12 months do not include the current month.

***

Just for data awareness, I note for my principles students that the typical person can only "feel" a difference in the unemployment of 0.5%. Even though we measure it down to the 0.1%., you can't feel those small changes unless they accumulate.

The U.S. economy now has an unemployment rate that is 0.9% higher than it was in April 2023. And most people would agree that jobs are a bit harder to get than they were a year ago.


Tuesday, July 30, 2024

Drinking Alcohol More Makes You Richer (Or Does It)

Or not.

But I got your attention, didn't I?

I'll get to the drinking in a minute. Before that, more broadly in social sciences, we run into the problem that most things that humans do are caused by a multitude of things. So the things we observe are caused by a bunch of other things. We ought to try and measure or observe those as completely as possible.

But the problem is worse than that. In understanding the relationships between those variables, omitting relevant variables is a much bigger problem than including irrelevant variables. 

So something that should set off all of your mental alarms is an overly broad claim based on an overly narrow set of variables.

For example, claiming that a single thing like drinking alcohol causes one to be richer. That's crazy, right? But that's what you might readily conclude from this:


Hmmm. Three richer areas have more drinkers, and two poorer areas have less drinkers.

The message here is that when you see something like this, every instinct should be to add other variables to see if this relationship goes away. If it does, then there is no relationship. If it persists, there's never an end to the process, but the more things you try which, in spite of their presence or addition, the relationship remains ... the more confident you should be that you've found something important.

This infographic comes from Visual Capitalist, a site which is pretty good at producing catchy graphics. Your takeaway should be that maybe those graphics require deeper thought.

Monday, July 29, 2024

Regulatory Policy Is Currently Based on Feelings Not Data

Government policy on competition is a micro thing that has macro consequences, as far as it affects growth.

Regulation to (hopefully encourage) competition by discouraging the potential for increased market power that can come with increasing concentration of an industry in fewer firms — is a decidedly more popular in left of center political parties (like the Democrats in the U.S.).

Monopolies do their monopoly thingie by marking prices up over marginal costs more than other industrial structures. That shifts surplus from consumers to producers. The regulatory thinking is that all moves within an industry towards fewer firms make that behavior more likely. 

But that doesn't just happen by itself. No product can be marked up much if its demand is inelastic. Think about it: the price of Coke is never "jacked up" because you and others will just switch to Pepsi. In economic jargon, that's saying that your demand for Coke is elastic rather than inelastic. In the real world then, there's very little taking advantage of consumers if their demand is elastic, but certainly the potential for that if their demand is inelastic. Do note that every firm will try to mark up more when demand is inelastic, whether or not their industry is more concentrated or not.

So the economic argument for price regulation rests on two features: 1) demand must be inelastic, and 2) the industry must be concentrated enough to act on that. The position of left/liberal regulators in the U.S. and other countries is that both of those have gotten worse over the last generation or two.

There's new research on both.

***

In "Rising Markups and the Role of Consumer Preferences" the authors measure marginal costs, prices, increased markups, and customer preferences. What they find is that marginal costs have been dropping. That's good: firms are being more efficient. But prices have changed much less, so markups must be getting bigger. What's interesting is that their evidence on consumer preferences indicates that this is because you and I have gotten less price sensitive, while the evidence on marginal costs indicates that industries have gotten more rather than less competitive. In "Trends In Competition In the United States: What Does the Evidence Show?" the authors note that industries are concentrated, but both in places where concentration is more heavily and less heavily regulated (suggesting that such regulation is a waste). Further, that concentration seems to be driven by technological improvements that benefit consumers through lower marginal costs. 

It probably should be noted that one of the authors of the second study was the chief economist at the Federal Trade Commission. He resigned early in the Biden administration; suspicions are that this was because they were taking regulatory enforcement in a less fact-based direction.

Thursday, July 18, 2024

What Makes People Happy?

What makes people happy is not central to macroeconomics. But a lot of people think it ought to be central to policies designed to affect macroeconomies.

For example, some claim that income distribution or environmental quality affects happiness. While they surely do, it's not clear if they are major or minor influences.

However, in another social science they're pretty sure they've pinned down what influences "life satisfaction".

Psychologists describe our personalities in terms of 5 (big) domains and many (smaller) nuances. For the most part, these are considered immutable within a person.

Life satisfaction is readily predicted by focusing on three of those domains: being extroverted, conscientious, and emotionally stable. At the nuance level, being unsatisfied is associated with "feeling misunderstood, unexcited, indecisive, envious, bored, used, unable, and unrewarded".

***

Fair enough. So here's the thing. Politicians talk a lot about policies to make peoples' lives better: higher tariffs to protect workers (Trump), containing rent inflation (Biden), and so on.

There are economic pros and cons to things like these. But do we envision them making people more ... conscientious, or less ... bored?  If not, maybe we're not helping people as much as we think we are. Just food for thought ...

G-7 vs G-20

Since 2005, the G-7 share of world GDP has declined, while the G-20 share has stayed about the same.


Most of that change is from growth of China (the largest economy in the G-20, but not the G-7). Those 13 "other" countries are currently about 1/3 of the global economy, and China is between 1/2 and 2/3 of that.

There's a few things to note. 

First, this does not reflect the G-7 countries doing badly (having said that, most of them haven't done that well over those 20 years). 

Second, it does reflect the other 13 countries doing well. This is good for humanity; most of these countries weren't doing that well before the 21st century.

Third, since this is about GDP, it doesn't tell us about richness or welfare. Just size.

Fourth, GDP growth comes from increases in labor, capital, and technology. There is no breakdown here, so it's possible that the increasing share is driven completely by an increasing share of population. It isn't ... but population growth rates tend to be higher in poorer countries, and that's going to tend to tilt the share of the G-7 downward.

Infographic published as part of the page entitled "Charted: The G7's Declining Share of Global GDP" from Visual Capitalist.

Sunday, July 14, 2024

Hey, Remember Guyana?

I posted about Guyana's problems with Venezuela in Spring 2024. 

This is what happens when you 1) get a little ahead, and 2) live next to thugs.

Guyana, due to development of its oil deposits, has moved rapidly up to above the 90th percentile for real GDP per capita (according to the IMF).

Do note that inequality is always an issue. Having said that, there's no countries on that list that are known for their high proportion of poor people: high GDP per capita buys a lot of infrastructure that improves the lives of just about everyone.

Wednesday, July 10, 2024

How Many Countries Are There? It Depends

In macroeconomics, we're really only concerned about countries, in the sense of do they measure their economy, and do they have policies that might affect it.

But the sources for this information come mostly from the countries themselves. Or more correctly from the states that claim to run those countries (see Chapter VI in the Handbook for the distinction).

It's a bit disconcerting for some students to find out that there isn't an official list of official countries. This shows up in the Handbook, and the Wikipedia pages underlying it, where different international agencies that gather data report different numbers of countries.

It should also be a little disconcerting to everyone in the bigger context of things because the UN says every country gets 1 vote, and no one else gets to vote. This may substantially increase the international political and macroeconomic power of some pretty tiny places.†

Anyway, I found a cute video (12 minutes) that goes over all the different ways to count countries.

† Here's something to annoy you going forward in your life. At various times in the U.S., the party holding most of the power will complain about all the states getting 2 votes in the Senate and 2 additional electoral votes (currently it's the Democrats complaining about this, but give it time). I've noticed over the years that the same people who do complain about the equal votes in the Senate do not complain about equal votes in the U.N. To me this suggests that this an argument of convenience (formally called an appeal to consequences) that's only pulled out when you don't have many better ones. My personal advice is to get doubly-suspicious when you hear it used. ;-)

Friday, May 31, 2024

"Trading Places"

The (very unwoke) 1983 movie Trading Places comes up occasionally in finance and macroeconomics discussions. It features a pair of rich and crooked brothers. 

The finance aspect is that they attempt to use a futures market to make a killing on frozen orange juice concentrate.

The macroeconomics aspect is the simultaneous and timed announcement of important data about the real economy.

Knowing that data in advance could inform an unscrupulous trader of what positions to take in a futures market to make the most profit.

But ... it's a comedy: the brothers are foiled by the ragtag group of Dan Ackroyd, Eddie Murphy, Jamie Lee Curtis and Denholm Elliott. Several years later, the brothers made a cameo in the Eddie Murphy star vehicle Coming to America.

***

Parts of this is loosely based on the true story of the Hunt brothers attempt to corner the market for silver in 1980. The screenplay developed from that story, and then evolved. Frozen orange juice concentrate was chosen because it seemed funnier.

At least temporarily, the brothers were eventually bankrupted by the scheme and fines.

All of the above is a prelude. In a little bit of history, the last of those brothers, known as Herbert, passed away last month. Like a lot of people, risky decisions lead to bankruptcy, but more risky decisions allow them to rebuild their wealth after bankruptcy.

***

P.S. Oddly, this movie has turned into a Christmas tradition ... in Italy ... where families often watch (a dubbed versions of) it as a family tradition (think A Christmas Story).

P.P.S. A younger (and somewhat less-involved in the scam) brother, Lamar, is better remembered these days as one of the founders of the AFL (the AFC championship trophy is named after him), and the initial owner of the Kansas City Chiefs.

P.P.P.S Interestingly, it used to only be a crime to get the advance info. Profiting from that was not illegal. That was changed in 2010, and the new law is known (seriously) as the "Eddie Murphy Rule". Nevermind that Murphy's character in the movie was one of the good guys.

Monday, May 20, 2024

Baltimore Harbor Update

The ship blocking the main channel for the last 2 months was refloated and moved today

Not sure to what extent the harbor is back up and running normally (it may have been even before this).

The major bridge bypassing downtown Baltimore is, of course, out for many years to come.

***

When we talk about (estimated) errors, or (estimated) residuals, or shock, or impulses in macroeconomics, we have a hard time narrowing in on what they are. This is mostly because a macroeconomy is a big thing that gets shocked by a lot of stuff. 

I'm not saying this was a large shock, or even an important one for the U.S., but it's a pretty obvious one.

Saturday, May 18, 2024

Uh oh (Monetary Policy Edition)

Visual Capitalist posted an infographic based on a Pew Research Center Poll from March 2023. It shows the level of trust that people had in various federal agencies.


What's scary to me is that 1) the Federal Reserve is near the bottom of the list, and 2) it's not even a government agency.

I have been teaching about the Federal Reserve every semester for almost 40 years. I have a lot of friends who work or worked there. Gosh ... I've applied for jobs there (or mostly with Federal Reserve Banks) perhaps 15 times.

Maybe I'm biased ... but I have a hard time thinking an entity that mostly employs macroeconomists is worth having an unfavorable impression of. Especially one that tries really hard to be transparent (literally hundreds of free publications available).

Having said all that, Americans have always viewed banking with suspicion, especially central banking. And the Federal Reserve does show up in a lot of conspiracy theories (no doubt because the spreaders read all the free literature). In addition, rural southern Utah is a hotbed of anti-Fed sentiment.

Inflation Under Presidents

We should not average a complex process like inflation by simply grouping dates under presidents.

Having said that, we do this with stuff like football team performance and their quarterback, so it's not like this sort of analysis is going to go away.

So here's the chart:

Now, this is useful because it's hard to get across to students how long it's been since we've had an inflation problem: Biden's average exceeds all presidents since Reagan. That's 1988, 36 years ago ... it's very likely a lot of your parents weren't even teenagers yet in 1988. 

It's also 2-3 presidents from each party, and 16 years from each party, so it's pretty fair to say this is not about Democrats vs. Republicans, but rather Biden being worse than everyone else.

In addition, the number from Reagan is deceptive. Carter lost his reelection bid to Reagan, in part, due to high inflation. And there was a hangover of high inflation going a couple of years into the Reagan administration, so the average for his second term would be much lower.

***

It's currently May and Biden is making speaking appearances where he claims that he inherited high inflation from Trump. This has been shot down as false, even by media that generally supports him. The inflation actually started ramping up a few months after Biden took over with a Democratically-controlled Congress. Inflation is driven in part by expectations, and this is consistent with expectations forming that new policies that were inflationary were being put in place.

***

Lastly, I'm of two minds about the note in the text box on the right. The point is correct. BUT, the shading does not correspond to the point (and I feel it is pretty obviously manipulative to put them so close together).

Anyway, it is true that the CPI used to include data on sales prices of new homes. And it is true that it now includes an imputed rent for owner-occupied housing (basically, not what your mortgage payment is, but rather a comparable of what you'd have to pay if you were renting instead of owning). The latter series is both smoother, and has shown less inflation that the former. Like most economists, I tend to think it's a better measure. But it does make for difficult comparisons.

The manipulative part though, is that they made the change over in 1985 — halfway through the Reagan administration. So imagine dividing Reagan in two, so there's one more bar. The top two (Carter and Reagan I) would behave differently than the bottom six. The effect of having all eight measured the same way is that it would be bring the top two and bottom six bars closer together (either by bumping the top two downward, or the bottom six upward).

The upshot is that Biden's numbers are a lot closer to Carter and Reagan I than they are to the other presidential terms in the middle. It turns out there's a paper that looks into this. First off, the BLS does maintain a CPI series that uses the pre-1985 method. But, 1) it's not as detailed as current series, 2) it isn't available before 1978, 3) it comes out with several months delay, and 4) it's not available publicly, and you have to ask for it specifically. But, in the paper they reconstruct CPI measurements going back to 1949, and forward to the date of publication (March 2022) that can be used for comparison.

So here's the data I got from the paper's linked spreadsheet. Keep in mind this shows Biden in a worse light than we would today, since it only goes through the 14th month of his term ... thus accentuating the high inflation period without showing the reduction in inflation. Having said that, it gives you a sense that the numbers we were seeing in 2022 were a lot closer to Carter era than to Trump's:

President
(Term and/or Initials As Needed)

CPI Inflation Rate
(Announced)
CPI Inflation Rate
(Post-1985 Method)
Carter 9.9% 8.4%
Reagan I 5.8% 6.2%
Reagan II 3.3% 4.0%
Bush, G.H.W. 4.3% 4.8%
Clinton I 2.8% 3.2%
Clinton II 2.4% 2.6%
Bush, G.W. I 2.3% 2.5%
Bush, G.W. II 3.3% 3.2%
Ohama I 1.7% 1.7%
Obama II 1.1% 1.3%
Trump 1.9% 1.9%
Biden (first 14 months) 5.6% 5.6%

If interested, the paper is Bollhuis, Cramer, and Summers, and is entitled "Comparing Past and Present Inflation". It has been published in a (gated) journal (Review of Finance, 2022), but a PDF of the working paper is readily available online. It also contains a link to their alternative data series.



Thursday, May 9, 2024

Austin Is So 2023

A little bit of macroeconomics here, noting that the lustre has faded for Austin. But Nashville is still on the rise

Interestingly, the author knows about FRED! The link to the data for the GDP of the Nashville metropolitan area, which is still somewhat smaller than that of Austin

FWIW: Salt Lake shows smaller than both in FRED, but this is misleading. I was not able to find GDP for what we call "up north" and others might call the Wastatch Front in FRED. Instead, what's in FRED is just Salt Lake County, which is fine, if you know there's a difference. But for us, "up north" is pretty much one continuous city from Santaquin to Tremonton, with tendrils going out to Logan, Park City, and Tooele. To get the GDP for that you have to look for Combined Metropolitan Statistical Area data (CMSA). This accounts for the fact that sometimes we want to count Provo or Ogden as part of Salt Lake, and sometimes we don't. When you get that data, Salt Lake shows as bigger than Nashville (which has a CMSA), or Austin (which only has a metropolitan statistical area, or MSA, because there are not other metro areas contiguous with it).

FWIW 2: Even these statistics are imperfect. I grew up in the suburbs of Buffalo, and the data show Buffalo to be a lot smaller than it actually is. Buffalo is smaller than Salt Lake these days.  But it's CMSA only includes Niagara Falls. Even though Rochester, with its own MSA, and nearly the size of Buffalo ... is actually closer than Provo is to Salt Lake's downtown. In fact, Santaquin to Tremonton is a longer drive than it is to get from Buffalo to Syracuse ... another large MSA. And nothing counts the adjacent parts of Canada to places like Buffalo, Detroit, and Bellingham. On the Canadian side from Buffalo, it's pretty much one continuous city from Fort Erie (across from Buffalo) through Niagara Falls (Canada), St. Catherines, Hamilton, and in to Toronto and out the other side. Anyway, this is another reason that the "lights at night" images are so important macroeconomically ... it's politics that keeps Buffalo separate from Rochester separate from Syracuse ... separate from Canadian cities ... even though Highmark stadium is full of people from those places on game day.

Tuesday, May 7, 2024

Before the Rust Belt was Rusty

Students in Utah in the 2020's sometimes have a hard time understanding why anyone ever wanted to live in the rust belt.

But ... check out this list of metropolitan areas with the highest incomes from 1949.

Only one city west of the Mississippi. None in the old South (especially, nothing in Texas or Florida). Heck ... only one on the east coast.

The phenomenon of the coasts being richer and the flyover states being poorer, is definitely one of the last 2 generations or so.

***

FWIW: think about the stories told by most of your relatives ... Utah was a place people moved away from until about 1990.


Sunday, May 5, 2024

Measuring Media Accuracy

There is an organization that measures the quality of media across countries. It's called Reporters Without Borders.

This is important for macroeconomics as the politicians and bureaucrats in many countries lie about performance. And then they're pronouncements are often taken at face value due to Westphalian Sovereignty.

N.B. As always, when looking at a "ranking" of entities, keep in mind that someone determined how to to weight things together. And you might not agree with those weights. So some digging is probably not a bad idea.

I decided to post about this because they publish a "heat map" every year of press freedom. But it's a biased one.

You actually need to click through to their website to see it. Sorry about that, but some sites don't like their stuff copied and reposted.

The problem is with their shading. Their index goes from 0 to 100. Scores from 40 to 100 are divided into 4 groups of equal width. That's OK as long as you do it across the entire range. But they don't. So their darkest (poorly rated) countries should be divided into at least 2 more groups (and that wouldn't be even, which is another no-no).

Most of you are probably interested in how the U.S. rates. And this problematic shading puts the U.S. in the middle of 5 groups, instead of in the third highest out of seven. This has the effect of making the U.S. seem much closer to say, China, than it really is.

Having said all that, this information was reposted at Statista in an even worse format:

So what's wrong with this one? Note that 3 of the shades are variations on reddish, and are quite distinct from the yellowish-tan, and turquoise-ish of the other 2 shades. This serves to visually group those three more closely together.

***

I would pay attention to their discussion of how the U.S. was rated. Most of their markdowns are pretty reasonable. Despite our first amendment, we probably should not be in the top groups.


Sunday, April 21, 2024

A Composite Update to Some Old Posts, Regarding Developments in AI Over the Last 18 Months

AI has been bubbling along for many years, but the real bloom was in November 2022, when ChatGPT 3.5 was rolled out. It was on a different level.

***

I have gone back and pulled forward a couple of old posts on this, and here offer some updates.

***

This first one is from June 11, 2010, and is entitled "Technology that Augments Labor with More Labor (Instead of Capital)". 

At that time, it seemed like nanotechnologies and cloning were going to be relevant sooner than AI.

How much more productive would you be if a digital version of yourself could do the grocery shopping? How about if it could get your car inspected? What if it could go to a lecture you’re not sure is worthwhile, evaluate it as you would, and report back on it?

Ummm ... you can already do that last one. Just get a Zoom lecture, feed it into Otter, feed its output into a personalized AI using ChatGPT 4, and done. I've done it. Fourteen years ago that was science fiction.

***

The second one is just a post about a poignant comic from July 25, 2011 entitled "Calling Robin Hanson". 

Digression: I hate what the internet has become since the advent of social media. We had a good 15 year run of being able to find everything, and with social media it's gotten harder to find anything. In particular, that "permanent link" from 15 years ago is gone (which is actually really stupid, because if the comic has moved to a new place, anyone thoughtful can code a redirect in seconds ... but ... no one did). Anyway, you can still find it here.

I'm pretty sure the artist drew this about the ennui of getting older. But my alternative take was what if your smartphone could do this. Again, that seemed like science fiction in 2011, but this is actually possible in 2024. Heck, this was possible several years ago. Now we can make deep fake videos that are way beyond the little asterisks in the comic.

***

The third one is from March 25, 2015, and is entitled "This Post Is Not a Joke". Here's a few updates.

Mongolia is no longer posting amazing growth rates. Ethiopia is. No ... wait ... that's so 2022 ... Guyana is boasting the highest growth rates now. But Mongolia does have a big capital city now, that's gotten pretty spiffy, even touristy, even if it is thousands of miles from ... anywhere. 

BTW: We used to get some Mongolian students in our MBA program, and they felt that Cedar City was just like Mongolia, climate-wise.

In 2015, I mentioned drones because I'd recently seen a live demonstration of a (remotely piloted) drone that could and did push the elevator buttons and get off at its chosen floor. I am quite sure they can probably do that without human control these days, but I have not seen it.

My mathematical point and graph from that post still hold true. There's no way to prove it, but I think some people have already shifted from the orange path to the blue one.

Some people still play Borderlands, and the last entry in its universe was made about the time ChatGPT 3.25 came out. You can't buy it new, but I'm sure you can find the original ClapTrap robot for sale on eBay.

Do note the paragraph about what I might do with more Stata knowledge than you. The thing is ... I don't need that anymore ... ChatGPT writes my Stata programs for me these days. And I had it write a PowerShell script last month to sort all the digital images on my hard drives. I am now wondering if I rated some of my digital images and trained it ... whether it could reasonably rate all my images of my kids and dogs as if I had done it??

Also, SoundHound is still around and still great. People say Shazam is better, and that may be so, but I find it to be more intrusive too. I started to think my son could really pull off being a professional pianist when after SoundHounding him for many years and getting nothing ... he started to be good enough that it would think he was one of the professional releases in its database.

And finally, the last paragraph was the part of the motivation for the optional section in Chapter III of the Handbook that I covered briefly in response to ME's question in the Discussions. AI may make our productivity higher but our measure of that productivity lower if it converts things that used to be expensive and rare into the cheap and commonplace. Of course, you already know that's true of your phone ... provided that you can maintain some focus while using it ;-)

 

A Tale of Two Earthquakes

Taiwan had a bad earthquake during this year's ECON 3020 class.

Turkey had a bad earthquake during last year's ECON 3020 class. 

The outcomes were not the same. And richness, as measured by nominal or PPP GDP per capita probably goes a long way towards explaining the differences.

***

Full reveal: I badly missed on my subjective forecast of casualties from last year's quake in Turkey. I anticipated the country doing a lot better than it did, largely because it is richer than many suppose. I was wrong. In retrospect, it was a pretty big earthquake in a fairly poor area of Turkey. So I now see it as more similar to the smaller Iranian earthquake in 2003.

***

The literature that economic growth is highly negatively correlated with deaths from natural disasters (mostly earthquakes) is fairly well-established (see here, here, here, and here). The second of those also points out that income inequality, which is fairly high in Turkey, is positively correlated with earthquake deaths. 

So, I do have a history of pointing out in ECON 3020 that high death tolls, say in Haiti in 2010 (here and here), are reprehensible but not surprising.

***

Here's the details on these two recent quakes.

Taiwan had a 7.4 quake a few weeks ago, Turkey had a 7.8 a year ago. 

The last death toll I could find for Taiwan was 16. Turkey's death toll was 53,000. 

Do note that the Richter scale is logarithmic, so the shaking in Turkey was more than a little bit worse. Even so, Turkey also lost three times more than Japan did to 2011's 9.1 earthquake AND tsunami.

Nominal GDP per capita in Taiwan is 3-4 times higher than that of Turkey; using PPP it's still 75-100% higher.

***

P.S. A contributing factor to Turkey's death toll may also be a lower standard of services provided to the large Kurdish minority near the epicenter.



A Macroeconomic Hotspot to be Worried About: China and Taiwan

I meant to write this much earlier in the semester ... but ... I've been a little busy this semester.

Anyway, it's been a long time since the world has seen a war as big as the one between Russia and Ukraine. In Europe, it's the biggest in 75 years.

In America, we tend to view the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (and the Gulf War too) as pretty big. But not really ... the wars were the easy parts of those, and largely foregone conclusions ... it was the long occupations that were problematic. The same thing with the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; or even the full-blown war between the UK and Argentina. No, we probably need to go back two generations to the 1970's to the Vietnam War for magnitude, and the fourth Arab-Israeli War for hotness, to get something that matches the last two years in Ukraine.

Even so, while the macroeconomic consequences for the U.S. have not been huge this time around, they are definitely an omnipresent concern. Witness the political ramblings over Ukraine aid that have taken place over the last few months.

***

Given all this, it is useful to put in perspective than a conflict between China and Taiwan would be a much bigger deal. The scuttlebutt this week, on both the left and right, is that Iran's hugely unsuccessful attack on Israel has got the Chinese rethinking their contingency plans regarding Taiwan.

First off, just using Chapter VI in the Handbook, China is macroeconomically 6 to 10 times as big as Russia. Taiwan's economy is 3 to 4 times the size of Ukraine. So this is a much bigger deal for the whole world.

In addition, the Taiwan Strait is over a hundred miles wide. It's not exactly open ocean, but it's definitely deep enough for sinking capital ships with major loss of life (it's been 40 years, but the world was pretty shocked when the Argentinians found out the hard way that the British were fighting for keeps in the open ocean).

Secondly, both countries are richer than Russia and Ukraine. Taiwan has legitimately been considered by outsiders to be a fully-developed economy for a generation. But the conditions are reversed. Russians are about 3 times as rich as the Ukrainians. The Chinese have about 1/3 of the real GDP per capital of the Taiwanese. 

The last time the world witnessed an economically poorer, but numerically superior country attacking a developed countries forces head on was ... probably China's surprise attack on the U.S. forces mopping up  North Korea in 1950. It's worse than that: an economically poorer but numerically superior force arguably hasn't attacked the homeland of a richer country since the initial Arab Moslem invasions of the Persian and Byzantine empires in the 7th century.

Third, the situation for China is probably extra tempting. China has a much larger population, putting its whole economy as about 20 times larger than that of Taiwan. Russia is more like 10 to 1 over Ukraine.

***

That last point is especially concerning given the 50 year international campaign of othering Taiwan.

Economically, this is right there in the PPP tables in Chapter VI of the Handbook. The World Bank doesn't provide economic data about Taiwan because it does not recognize Taiwan as existing as an independent country. 

The UN does a little better by publishing some data about Taiwan, but it has excluded Taiwan from the UN itself since 1971. Yeah, it's a little laughable that it calls itself the United Nations when it excludes one of the largest economies in the world.

The backstory here is that China was coming apart at the seams for the first third of the 20th century. Eventually, a government that came to be known as Nationalist to us in the west asserted control over much of the country. Even so, there was an ongoing and significant communist rebellion (that's not really the right word for it, but there may not be a good one). They put aside their differences while fighting the Japanese, but turned on each other again in 1945 in full civil war. By 1949, the Nationalists had fled to the island of Taiwan (taking most of the ships with them).

China has successfully sold the argument that Taiwan is thus just a rebellious province, and therefore there is only one China. That position was laughed at through the 50s and 60s, but gained ascendancy in the 1970s, mostly by portraying itself as a non-aligned, Third World, country (see Chapter VI in the Handbook again). One can easily imagine that justifying a "Round 2" with the descendants of the Nationalists.

Taiwan begs to differ. The island's indigenous minority peoples aren't Chinese at all; they're closely related to Filipinos and Indonesians. The history of the Chinese in Taiwan only goes back several hundred years, and the interest of Chinese emperors in the island was tenuous at best. Then the Japanese were awarded Taiwan after a war with China, and it became part of Japan for 50 years. At the time that the Nationalists went there it was still considered to be part of occupied Japan. And in the 1952 treaty that settled World War II in Asia, the Japanese gave up title to the island, but it was not awarded back to China. It wasn't given to the Nationalists either, which probably doesn't help the situation. Really, the only way to read that is they were working under the adage that possession is 9/10 of the law.

In sum, Russia has a much better claim to some or all of Ukraine than China does to Taiwan. Russia has at least included Ukraine for 2-3 centuries, and its only been 33 years since their (at the time) amicable split.

***

It is probably not wise to underestimate the stupidity of the current regime in China. They have squandered a lot of hard won international goodwill over the last ten years. Could that include invading Taiwan someday? I didn't used to think so. Now I'm not so sure.

It's also useful to keep in mind that while the world was distracted with CoVid and lockdowns that China unilaterally abrogated its treaty obligations to honor Hong Kong's distinct a pro-western developmental path. So it's definitely on the move.

***

OK. Enough about how economics influences politics. Sometimes the economics works in mysterious ways. 

In particular, I would be incomplete without noting that a lot of the financing that's allowed southern China to thrive comes from ... Taiwanese investors. But like many foreign investors, they've been backing away the last 10-15 years as well.

***

Full reveal. It's been hard to assess this since the lockdowns, but historically China's Great Firewall has blocked this blog for expressing what I regard as realistic data and viewpoints. This was problematic for Chinese students attempting to complete my course remotely in 2020 and 2021.

Applying the Handbook: Sweden and Finland, Turkey, NATO and the OECD (and Kurds, Sunnis, and Indo-European Languages)

There's a lot to unpack in this one. But it's a great application of the implications of the measurements in Chapter VI of the Handbook, and the observations of growth told throughout.

For most of its history, Sweden and Finland weren't in NATO.

Then Russia invaded another non-NATO country in Ukraine, and both countries reconsidered. Gee ... ya' think?

Except Turkey was in NATO, and didn't want Sweden and Finland in the club. And NATO is a military alliance: you don't get in without unanimous approval of your new allies.

After about a year, Finland got in. After about another year, Sweden got in (just last month).

How does that all work??

***

First, Turkey is super-underrated by Americans as a macroeconomic power. It is not as big as the "big 4" western European countries, but it is solidly in the second tier with Russia and Spain (see the top deciles for GDP in Chapter VI). So it has weight it can throw around. It's also economically bigger than Sweden, and quite a bit bigger than Finland.

Second, given the war in Ukraine, Sweden and Finland wanted in to NATO. So what would they give up in the bargain?

Third, Turkey blocked them for a several of months, bargained for and got some concessions. Hmmm ... and Turkey's economy is bigger than both Sweden and Finland (maybe there's something to this macro stuff), and that accounts for a lot of their influence.

***

NATO is the military alliance, and the OECD is the overlapping economic group of developed and developing capitalist countries. 

Sweden and Finland were not members of NATO. Turkey was. Sweden, Finland, and Turkey are all OECD members too. It stands to reason that the Turks view themselves as fuller members of the club of important countries, in a way that American might not recognize.

Also, Turkey is a really important NATO member. Consistently active since the start, and militarily large. Also, given western European prejudices about language, religion, and skin color ... NATO is Turkey's connection into the club of big, important, countries. So, if Turkey objects to Sweden and Finland joining, NATO will listen because Turkey has been trying very hard to get western Europeans to pay attention to them and this is their wedge issue to make that happen.

***

Why is Turkey in NATO?

This actually goes back 4500 years.  The first horse-oriented people to ride out of the Eurasian steppes and conquer everyone in their path was ... us. (For reference down below, the Indo-European language group is called that because some went west to Europe and others went south to what is now India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey). Then came the Huns, Avars, and Magyars, who over about 500 years eventually became Hungary. Third came the Turks, who stayed in what is now called Turkey, and after them, the Mongols who rode back home.

Over the next several hundred years, the Turks fight off Crusaders, and eventually conquer the Byzantine Empire. Through the 16th and 17th century, they vied for being the strongest empire in Europe.

But it was a loose, decentralized, empire: the Ottoman Empire was ruled by Turks, but it was much more than them and not tightly held. As an example, the Barbary pirates against whom  America fought its first war after the revolution (you know, as in the Marines song "... To the shores of Tripoli") were, in fact, nominally subjects of the Ottomans.

Three things happened as the Ottomans faded from their peak. First, some of the European states started more seriously centralizing power over their nations to form some of the nation-states we still have today. Second, it seems to have been a coincidence, but economic growth started up in the same region as those new western nation-states. As they got economically bigger, they started to extend their political and military influence. And third, a more eastern nation-state in Russia started picking off parts around the edges of the Ottoman Empire.

Both the perception and reality we still have that Russia and Turkey are poorer and somewhat backwards is not so much because they did anything badly. Rather it's that western Europe and America opened a gap by growing first. Turkey didn't get poor. Turkey was normal. Instead, other parts of the world got abnormally rich first. Russia and Turkey did too, but because they weren't as close geographically to the origin of economic growth, they started later. They are poorer today because we got the jump on them then.

But the Russian Empire did centralize into a nation-state and the Ottoman Empire did not. Because it could focus its resources, for 2 centuries it took lands away from the Ottomans.

Now, along come the Prussians who wrest dominance of the Germans from the Austrians in the 1860s, and form another empire. It's insufficiently appreciated in the U.S. the extent to which the new German state always regarded Russia as the big threat. Everyone else, including France and England, was an afterthought. So who do the Germans go looking for as an ally in Europe? Russia's enemy: the Ottoman Empire. And recognizing that economic growth was already happening there too, they put a lot of extra economic support into that region in the years leading up to World War I. 

Not surprisingly, the Ottoman Empire fights on the side of the German Empire in World War I. And Americans tend to forget (or never knew) that they hold their own on several fronts, including one against Russia ... because they were a bigger player than we care to know.

After World War I, three fading empires are broken up. Austria-Hungary becomes a bunch of little countries along ethnic lines. Russia loses some territory, and turns inward as the Soviet Union. And the Turks lose a lot of loosely held territory, throw out their sultans, and establish a nation-state that's centered on a civilian controlled military as the most effective institution. But, while it's a very stripped down empire, it's still ruling some other nations. More on that later.

To some extent, the Nazis line up the same team for World War II: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria fight with them both times (and the Czechs were more solid than they care to admit). They tried pretty hard to get Turkey involved too (if you're curious, a little historical reading shows those Nazis in the Indiana Jones movies were not just randomly placed in the Middle East ... they really were there opportunistically in the 30s). To its credit, the new Turkey was not interested.

***

So Turkey is trying to be new and different place after World War I, and after World War II they want everyone to remember that they really were different the second time around and had stayed neutral.

And, in the wake of World War II, the western countries return to worrying about the Soviet Union. And Turkey chimes in to point out that they've had problems with the Russians for centuries.

So when NATO forms, Turkey is admitted almost immediately. And historically, Turkey has been the 3rd biggest contributor to NATO. Why? Partly because they want to be supportive to help change western perceptions of them, but also because they're macroeconomically bigger than Americans tend to recognize: in the 92nd or 93rd percentile according to Chapter VI in the Handbook ... comparable to Mexico. And they have an effective institution in their civilian-controlled military which can be directed to serve larger aims.

And all through this period, Turkey's economy is growing, and Turks are becoming richer. In the 57th or 70th percentile according to the Handbook: comparable to the Russians, Mexicans, or Chinese.

The bottom line for macroeconomists is that a country like Mexico is aspirational for many other countries. Well, Turkey is also aspirational for many other countries, and Americans should understand that better. More on that later.

***

So why was Sweden not in NATO?

It is believed this was mostly threat based. Sweden was officially neutral in both World Wars, but was pretty cozy with Nazi Germany. So after World War II, the Soviets used their size to lean on Sweden and tell the littler country to keep its nose clean going forward.

Again, the country with the bigger GDP ... 3 to 7 times as big according to Chapter VI ... gets its way. And the Soviet Union was even bigger than its remnant in Russia.

***

And why was Finland not in NATO? This is more complex.

The Finns had been dominated by the Russians since the early 18th century. Then what is now Finland was part of the Russian Empire. But the Finns freed themselves during the Russian Revolution. 

At the beginning of World War II, Hitler and Stalin were allies. One of the things the Soviets got out of that was a promise that the Nazis wouldn't object if the Soviets attacked Finland. Which they did a few months later. 

Fairly obviously then, when the Nazis turned on the Soviets in 1941, the Finns went along for the ride for a few years.

But, as the tide turned, Finland switched sides in return for promises from the ascendant Soviets that they would not invade.

So after the war the Soviet pitch was more along the lines of you're our ally now, so don't even think about joining NATO. Probably the only reason they didn't join the Warsaw Pact was that the Soviets never stationed troops there.

Again, the country with the bigger GDP gets its way. Russia has 5 to 15 times the GDP of Finland, and is right next door.

***

None of this addresses why Turkey would not want to have Sweden and Finland as allies in the 2020s.

There's two parts to this.

One, Turkey is economically bigger than either Sweden or Finland, so it's very likely that the Turks would be helping to defend the Swedes and Finns, rather than the other way around. Again, consulting Chapter VI, Turkey is a third bigger than Sweden, and 2-3 times the size of Finland. Turkey also has that big and effective and dispatchable military.

Secondly, Sweden and Finland have a history of supporting militant minorities in Turkey. 

That's probably not that smart.  

And, I don't know that there's any evidence of this, but it makes sense to speculate that Russian intelligence encouraged their smaller non-enemies in the north to support divisiveness in their bigger enemy to the south. 

Again, the story is of an economically bigger country (the Soviets and then the Russians), that leans on smaller countries (Sweden and Finland), to make trouble for the medium-sized country (Turkey).

***

In the middle of this are the Kurds. Who are the they, and how did they get involved in this situation?

Again, there are several threads from Chapter VI in the Handbook at work here.

In the 19th century, there's greater interest in nationalism, and the idea that countries should coincide with nations with their own state.

But there's also the reasonable 19th century observation that most of the country-nation-states that are growing in economic power ... were also pretty big to begin with. So there's a bias against small countries because it was thought they would not be viable. The idea that a Switzerland or The Netherlands could become economically powerful didn't happen until after World War II. This is the polar opposite from the view from the 1960s onward that we ought to give every nation a chance to grow and be rich no matter how small. And honestly, the jury is still out on whether that happens in anything other than the special cases of banking and tax havens (see the discussions in Chapter VI on richness vs. bigness).

Anyway, that bias is there after World War I. So when they completely break up the empire of Austria-Hungary, mostly break up the Ottoman Empire, and lop some chunks off what was the Russian Empire, the plan is to make sure the new countries succeed by making them big enough.

But what if the nations aren't big enough to reach whatever size threshold was envisioned for a country? Well, that's how we got Czechoslovakia! Which amicably broke into 2 countries about 30 years ago, because the Czechs and the Slovaks don't view each other as the same. That one worked pretty well. But it's also how we got Yugoslavia, which broke apart with genocidal events at about the same time. 

And it's also how we got Iraq! Which was never a country until the U.K. (again, a bigger economy) decided to clip economically desirable parts (full of oil) off of the economically smaller and poorer Turkey between the wars. But, the region had smaller nations, so it cobbled 3 bigger ones, and a some smaller ones, into one country. One of those bigger groups was the Kurds, some of whom were also in Persia (before it renamed itself Iran), and a bunch of whom were left in the new-ish Turkey.

***

Update: I forgot to mention that there were several treaties involved in the carving up of the Ottoman Empire. An initial one signed while the Ottomans still held power did give the Kurds their own country mostly inside current Turkish borders. But before it was put into effect, the Ottomans were overthrown, and the new Turkish government negotiated new treaties, the most important of which did not give the Kurds their own country.

***

So what makes the Kurds view themselves as a nation? 

Ethnically and culturally Kurds are related to the Iranians, and they speak a language that is distantly related to English, but fairly closely related to Persian (the prime language of Iran). Recall that these languages are hugely distinct from Turkish. 

However, Islam has two big divisions: Sunni (about 80%) and Shia. And they regard each other as apostate (analogous to Catholics and Protestants in Europe in the 16th century). The Iranians are Shia, but the Kurds are Sunni. 

So Iran has a majority of Shia Iranians, and a minority of Sunni Kurds. Iraq has Sunni Kurds mixed with some Shiites, and Arab Sunnis. And Turkey is Sunni, but the Turks speak a vastly different language from the Kurds, and have dominated them for centuries. 

So the Kurds think of themselves as a distinct nation without a country or state.

And that tends to foment violence and revolutionary tendencies. 

Into which the Swedes and Finns blundered by accepting Kurdish refugees for decades ... probably because they were an oppressed nation. Which is very big-hearted. But also, it's a recipe for trouble because, as is typical, there's exiled revolutionaries and militants mixed in.

There's also a problem that we've seen globally over the last 50 years. It used to be that oppressed minorities didn't travel very far. Everyone was poor, and maintaining links to home if you emigrated was not cheap. Think about how a few centuries ago very few Europeans could afford to move to America. And how even as that became more common, and people were drawn from increasingly remote parts, it was too expensive for most to stay in touch with the home country. That's not really the case over the last few decades: more people can afford to move around the globe, and maintain better ties with their homelands. So as everyone gets richer, because everyone eventually hits that kink in Chapter II of the Handbook, we see a lot of local militant/terrorist/revolutionary activity extending tentacles like an octopus from a head that's safely at a distance.

Thus, Turkey has a long-standing beef with Sweden and Finland that they harbor and maybe even nurture terrorists able to reach and target Turks in Turkey.

***

We are probably never going to know what the Finns and Swedes conceded to the Turks to get into NATO. But it took the Finns a year to agree to it, and it took the Swedes two ... so it is probably not a minor thing. 

It should also be fairly clear that there was probably a huge pressure on Turkey from the more western countries in NATO.

Also, keep in mind that Turkey is aspirational for lots of developing countries around the globe. They probably don't think they can be like Sweden or Finland, but they can be like Turkey some day. So it's a good bet that a lot of states around the world had their diplomats tell the Swedes and Finns to back off a bit.

 One thing is for sure: it is probably very bad for the Kurds who are still in Turkey.

Friday, March 29, 2024

Supply Chain Issues and the Baltimore Ship/Bridge Disaster

A problem with a disaster, like the ship hitting the bridge in Baltimore, is that it upsets supply chains.

Supply chains are the links from sources of resources, through manufacturers, warehouses, and retailers, through to final consumers. These are like trees with many branches: literally thousands of branches for most of the products you buy.

A disruption at any point in that supply chain can have effects both downstream (all the way to consumers) and upstream (all the way to resource extractors). 

Recall that during the early part of CoVid/lockdowns that the store shelves were empty? Recall that about 18 months after that (in late 2021) we had additional problems with getting stuff on shelves. Those are the visible effects of supply chain disruptions.

The closing of the port of Baltimore won't create huge disruptions, since it's not a really major port. But it will create some.

Interestingly, the biggest disruption is probably going to be to cars imported from Europe for sale in the northeast. Almost all of those come through Baltimore. Why is that? Because what's called a roll-on-roll-off ship carries about 5,000 cars (for perspective, the SUU campus has about 4,000 parking spots, but they're never all full at the same time). They all arrive at the same time, and the port that they all go to is the one that already has big parking lots built, for the cars to be unloaded into. Then they all get trucked out, to create room for the next ship's cargo. There's really just one of those on the east coast: Baltimore.

The other thing that will be affected is coal mines in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia. Students tend not to know this, but most coal burned in the U.S. is hard, and relatively clean, and comes from strip mines in Wyoming. The softer, dirtier coal, from tunnel mines that we all have in our imagination isn't used much anymore. It's mostly found in the Appalachian mountains, and exported to places like India. And most of it goes through ... Baltimore.

What the Baltimore Ship/Bridge Disaster Will Do to the Budget Deficit

On Monday we discussed how the announced deficit is not as accurate as it sounds. This is because the government doesn't actually know how much it will spend or receive in advance. For example, natural disasters can make the deficit worse because extra money is spent in disaster relief.

Then on Tuesday a cargo ship hit and collapsed a bridge, effectively blocking the harbor of Baltimore.

At this time it isn't clear who own the bridge, or to what extent it was insured. But, the state of Maryland almost immediately announced they don't have the money to rebuild it. This is not surprising: most big transportation infrastructure projects are funded by the federal government, with the work managed at the sate level. So, it should not be surprising that within a day the federal Department of Transportation announced they would be getting the bridge rebuilt as quickly as possible.

I am not sure how much a bridge that's both long, and high, over water, will cost. My guess is $5B. If I'm right, while this will increase the deficit, it won't increase it by much: the deficit is roughly $1.7T/year or $1,700B/year. That works out to be less than 1%.

The people in the federal government are not as dumb as most people think. There is money set aside for this sort of thing. But, just like households that save for a rainy day, that amount will help, but may not cover the whole cost. That money has already been allocated by Congress, so it's considered "spent" already, and would not add to the deficit. Anything extra on top of that would add to the deficit.

Monday, March 11, 2024

Problems with Canals

Excellent piece in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Two Canals, Two Big Problems —One Global Shipping Mess".

Of course, we've covered the problems with the Houthis and the Suez Canal.


 

This map was included in the article, and shows routes on which ship traffic has increased from 12/23 to 12/24. Note that the route through the Red Sea is barely shaded, while the routes around Africa are bright red. 

I believe the red routes from our Gulf coast to southern Europe are largely our exports of liquefied natural gas (replacing shipments that are no longer being made from Russia).

Also note the traffic around the southern tip of South America. Even in the 21st century, this is a stormy route that ships try to avoid. But if they can't get through the Panama Canal, that's the only way to go.

The problem with the Panama Canal is drought: there isn't enough water sometimes to move the ships.The article contains an animated infographic explaining the problem.

Has the State Failed in Haiti?

Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas. It has not had much of a viable state for the last 2 generations.

But, it really seems to have come apart over the last month, with armed gangs apparently taking over the country.

The Prime Minister is currently in Puerto Rico. It's unclear if any part of the state is actually functioning. The Dominican Republic, which has done quite well economically over the last 30 years, refused to let the Haitian Prime Minister land there and drive across the border.

The U.S. has evacuated nationals, and added troops to the embassy.

Here's the Google search page for Haitian news.

In the language of Chapter VI in the Handbook, the country still exists, the nation of Haitians still exists, but the state is barely holding on.

Macroeconomically ... expect a humanitarian crisis in Haiti over the next several months.

Update 1: the Prime Minister of Haiti did promise to resign the day after I posted this. He has yet to return to Haiti or even to the island of Hispaniola (that Haiti shares with the Dominican Republic). And he set conditions on his resignation having to do with the transfer of the Haitian state to its next leader.

Update 2: Haiti has not even had what one could call a coup (where the leader of a state is forcefully replaced with a new leader). Instead, gangs are just running rampant. The apparently strongest gang leader goes by the name "Barbecue". I am not confident of the willingness of someone who goes by Barbecue to observe the polite and formal transfer of power proposed by a former Prime Minister with little or no power base in the country.